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How Pokemon IVs Are Calculated Under the Hood — A Reverse Engineering Guide

If you've ever wondered whether that wild Pokemon you just caught has competitive potential, you've probably heard the term IVs (Individual Values) thrown around. IVs are the hidden genetics of every Pokemon — the 0–31 numbers baked into your Pokemon at birth that determine how strong it can ultimately become. But here's the thing: the game never tells you what your IVs are. You have to reverse-engineer them. In this post, I'll walk you through exactly how IV calculators work under the hood — from the official stat formula, to the nature modifier trick, to why you often get a range instead of a single number. Live Tool: Try the calculator at randompokemongenerator.me/iv-calculator — free, no sign-up required, supports Gen III through Gen IX. What Are IVs, Exactly? Individual Values are six hidden integers between 0 and 31 , one for each stat (HP, Attack, Defense, Sp. Atk, Sp. Def, Speed). They represent the genetic potential of a Pokemon and are permanently set when the Pokemon is encountered or hatched — they can never be changed by leveling up or any in-game action. A stat with 31 IVs reaches its maximum possible value at level 100. A stat with 0 IVs starts at its theoretical minimum. In competitive play, players typically hunt for Pokemon with at least 3–4 perfect (31) IVs , with some strategies deliberately using 0 IVs in Defense or Speed for tactical advantages. The IV system as we know it today started in Generation III (Ruby/Sapphire/Emerald). Gen I–II used a predecessor called DVs (Determinant Values) , which only covered four stats and worked differently — so if you're playing on Virtual Console or Gen I/II, this calculator won't apply. The Stat Formula (Gen III+) The foundation of everything is the official stat calculation formula introduced in Generation III and still used today: For HP: HP = floor(((2 × BaseStat + IV + floor(EV / 4)) × Level) / 100) + Level + 10 For all other stats: Stat = floor((floor(((2 × BaseStat + IV + floor(EV / 4)) × Level) / 100

2026-08-07 原文 →
开发者

Trevor Noah is hosting Google’s Pixel 11 launch event

Google is set to host its next live Made by Google hardware launch event on August 12th, and the company says in a new video that comedian Trevor Noah will be hosting the show. The video indicates that the event will feature other celebrities and influencers as well, including Call Her Daddy host Alex Cooper […]

2026-08-07 原文 →
开发者

Por qué tu bot recibe 403 de Cloudflare (y cómo endurecer un cliente ccxt)

Si automatizas un exchange con ccxt , tarde o temprano lo verás en los logs: rachas cortas de 403 Forbidden que pegan a fetch_balance , a los OHLCV o al saldo de earn, y que desaparecen solas a los pocos minutos. No es que tu API key esté mal. Es el WAF (Cloudflare) que muchos exchanges ponen delante de su REST, challengueando a algo que "parece un bot". Y tu bot es un bot — pero uno legítimo , operando tu propia cuenta contra la API oficial. El problema no es de permisos, es de reputación de cliente HTTP. Esto va de reducir los falsos positivos del WAF, no de evadir ningún control de acceso. Dos capas que lo mitigan Saqué este patrón de un bot propio sobre OKX, tras varias rachas de 403, y lo publiqué como librería: ccxt-resilience (Apache-2.0). 1. Que el WAF challengue menos: harden Un cliente ccxt por defecto se anuncia como lo que es. Ajustar un User-Agent de navegador, la cabecera Accept-Language y un timeout holgado hace que Cloudflare lo desafíe con menos frecuencia: import ccxt from ccxt_resilience import harden exchange = harden ( ccxt . okx ({ " apiKey " : ..., " secret " : ..., " password " : ..., })) harden toca un cliente ya construido , devuelve el mismo objeto (encadenable) y nunca rompe su construcción: si algo falla al fijar los atributos, los deja como estaban. 2. Reintentar solo lo que se debe: with_retry La tentación es envolver todo en un try/except que reintente. Es una trampa: reintentar un error de credenciales o de fondos solo gasta tiempo, termina igual de mal, y esconde bugs de lógica detrás de esperas. La clave es reintentar únicamente lo transitorio —403/Cloudflare, 429, timeouts— con backoff exponencial y jitter, y re-lanzar los errores reales en el acto: from ccxt_resilience import with_retry balance = with_retry ( exchange . fetch_balance ) ohlcv = with_retry ( exchange . fetch_ohlcv , " BTC/USDT " , timeframe = " 1m " , attempts = 4 , base = 1.0 , max_s = 8.0 ) Un error de autenticación se re-lanza inmediatamente, sin reintentar. Y s

2026-08-07 原文 →
AI 资讯

The messy politics behind Google’s big AI shakeup

In the AI industry, Google prides itself on seeming like the adult in the room: quiet, stable, time-tested. On Wednesday, even as the company announced its largest AI org shakeup yet, Google and its leaders presented a unified front, keeping their messaging focused on how the changes tee up future success. But the reality is […]

2026-08-06 原文 →
AI 资讯

You can now ask Google Maps’ AI to order food for you

The AI-powered "Ask Maps" tool in Google Maps can now perform a broader range of personalized and conversational requests, including ordering food, finding hotels, and providing suggestions that factor in your existing plans. These are among several new features announced for Ask Maps today, which aim to "make it easier than ever to get more […]

2026-08-06 原文 →
AI 资讯

Adversarial Clothing Designed to Fool Facial Recognition Systems

There are many companies manufacturing adversarial clothing designed to confuse facial recognition systems. It’s a cool idea, but I worry that it’s mostly security theater: “Our patterns play with that chaos, confuse algorithms and make it way harder to pin you down,” he said. Bell, however, said “none of these products are tried and tested, and a lot of these surveillance technologies can deal with a little resistance … [but] even if the designs don’t necessarily work perfectly, fashion is also a visible sign of resistance. “This is consumers collectively coming together to make a visible statement.”...

2026-08-06 原文 →
AI 资讯

Vercel Labs Ships Zero: A Graph-First Language Built So Agents Write the Code

Vercel Labs has introduced Zero, an experimental systems programming language aimed at AI rather than human users. It employs unique features like a specific toolchain contract and structured error messages. Reaching version 0.3.4, it compiles to native binaries for major operating systems. The language prioritizes size, speed, and agent usability, though it is still in development. By Daniel Curtis

2026-08-06 原文 →
AI 资讯

EU AI Act Four Risk Levels: What Developers and Enterprises Need to Know

The European Union's AI Act establishes a risk-based framework for AI systems that ranges from prohibited practices to minimal-risk uses. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 divides the framework into four levels: unacceptable risk, high risk, limited risk and minimal risk. For AI developers, vendors and enterprises, the practical importance is straightforward: the system's risk category determines whether it can be used and, if so, the level of compliance, transparency and governance expected around it. The regulation entered into force on 1 August 2024 . Its four-tier approach is designed to avoid applying the same regulatory burden to every AI use case. Instead, the Act reserves its strictest treatment for systems that present the greatest risk, while leaving minimal-risk systems without additional sector-specific obligations under the AI Act beyond general law. The definitive reference is the official text of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 . Although older explainers may use slightly different labels for transparency-related obligations, the final binding regulation is consistently described by EU institutions as a four-level risk framework. The EU AI Act's four risk levels The categories are not simply labels for how sophisticated an AI model is. They are a regulatory method for connecting an AI system's use and potential impact with corresponding obligations. A business cannot determine its position merely by calling a tool "low risk". It needs to assess the system against the Act's framework and the obligations associated with the applicable category. Risk level Regulatory position Core consequence Unacceptable risk Prohibited AI practices The practices are banned outright. High risk Systems subject to extensive obligations Requirements include conformity assessments and risk management. Limited risk Systems subject to certain requirements Transparency and oversight requirements apply in relevant cases. Minimal risk Most AI systems No additional sector-specific AI Act oblig

2026-08-06 原文 →
AI 资讯

Kill switch for noisy uptime checks: a feature flag to disable a polling client

Use a kill switch inside the checker when your uptime probes start amplifying an incident — one feature flag, read on every tick, that can disable the noisy checks and stop the retries at the source. Reach for tuned backoff and jitter instead when the retry storm stays inside a single process and never fans out onto a dependency somebody else is paging for. Both are cheap to build. Only one of them lets you quiet a polling client while its target is already on fire. I run cron and queue infrastructure, so most of my pages arrive as either "the job didn't run" or "the job ran four times." Health checking sits in the same family of problems: a small, frequent, automated request that multiplies badly when something upstream changes shape. What follows is the runbook I settled on after a fleet of pollers turned a non-incident into a real one — the failure mode, where the switch belongs, the implementation, and how to verify the flip before you walk away from the terminal. What actually turns a polling client's uptime checks into a retry storm? Amplification. A single check is one request every 15 or 30 seconds, which nobody notices; a fleet of checks with retries layered on top is a synchronized load generator pointed at whatever you decided was important enough to monitor. The math is unkind. Take 40 instances, a 5s interval, and 3 retries per failed attempt, and a dependency that normally handles a trickle of health traffic suddenly sees a couple thousand requests a minute — all of them arriving at the exact moment it's least able to absorb them. Retries stack on top of the polling interval rather than replacing it, and because every poller sees the same failure at the same time, they all back off together and return together. The Google SRE book calls out this shape under cascading failures, and the load pattern that comes out of it looks nothing like organic traffic: sawtooth spikes, perfectly aligned, growing until something sheds load. The worst one I've dealt wit

2026-08-06 原文 →