Anthropic Says Claude Hacked 3 Organizations During Cybersecurity Tests
In a review triggered by OpenAI’s Hugging Face incident, Anthropic discovered three of its AI models had breached real organizations during third-party evaluations.
找到 184 篇相关文章
In a review triggered by OpenAI’s Hugging Face incident, Anthropic discovered three of its AI models had breached real organizations during third-party evaluations.
A memo obtained by WIRED, issued by the water utilities information sharing group WaterISAC, links dozens of cyberattacks against Minnesota water utilities to Tehran.
The health tech data giant, which handles vast amounts of patients' medical data, said hackers struck one of its protected health data stores.
Cybersecurity experts told TechCrunch that one of the biggest lessons to be taken from the OpenAI hack against Hugging Face has nothing to do with AI, but traditional cybersecurity defense.
If the generative AI giant had followed well-known security best practices, it’s likely that its AI agent would never have escaped to the open internet and hacked multiple companies.
This essay was written with Barath Raghavan, and originally appeared in The Guardian . In July, Hugging Face, a company that hosts much of the world’s AI software and open-source AI models, was hacked. A malicious dataset had been used to run code on one of its servers. Whoever was behind it captured internal security credentials and moved through systems over a weekend, running thousands of actions from a swarm of temporary server environments. It looked like the work of a sophisticated criminal group. It was not. It was one of OpenAI’s new, still unreleased GPT models...
In a new disclosure, OpenAI says its agent used exposed logins to gain access to at least four “publicly available services” in its unhinged quest to solve a test.
More electric vehicles are becoming capable of providing backup power at a time when the US is increasingly in need of more electrons.
The Series A was led by Battery Ventures, bringing AegisAI total funding to $49 million.
An updated government advisory warns that Iranian hackers are exploiting systems used by water and energy providers.
If you are an enterprise architect working on Microsoft Entra and AI agents, your first overdue job is not another policy wizard, another dashboard, or another governance steering committee. It is schema design. Specifically, it is deciding how you classify non-human identities with custom security attributes in Microsoft Entra . Not eventually. Up front. I keep seeing the same pattern across customers of every size: teams move quickly on agent experimentation, they onboard identities, they test controls, and then they realize they have no consistent attribute language for policy scope. At that point, every policy becomes a naming convention problem in disguise. That is backwards. The control plane starts with classification Custom security attributes are not decorative metadata. They are tenant-scoped key-value classifications you can assign to users, enterprise applications (service principals), and agent identities that are modeled as a service principal subtype, with dedicated role and permission boundaries for who can define and assign them ( overview , Graph model , agent identity service principal model ). That alone should change how architects think about them. This is not "nice to have taxonomy." This is policy input. Microsoft Entra Conditional Access for agents supports attribute-driven targeting with custom security attributes, and policy evaluation happens during token issuance and refresh, not just at policy authoring time ( Conditional Access for agents ). In other words: if your classification is sloppy, your runtime decisions are sloppy. Why agents raise the stakes You can say "an agent identity is still a service principal" and be technically correct. Microsoft Entra Agent ID is built on service principal infrastructure ( agent identities, service principals, and applications ). You can also miss the point. Agent identity introduces a blueprint-centered model where one blueprint can represent many agents, where blueprint-level policy decisions can
OpenAI made a mistake setting up what it called a “highly isolated” testing environment and sandbox. According to cybersecurity experts, that human mistake is what made the AI-powered attack on Hugging Face possible.
Anthropic leaped to a $47 billion revenue run rate by May, compared to $9 billion in 2025. It’s the kind of growth that Menlo Ventures’ Matt Murphy says he’s never seen in 25 years of investing, not in the internet wave, not in mobile, not in the first cloud boom. Menlo led Anthropic’s $500M Series D, and Murphy has had a front-row seat as the company went from a pre-revenue, […]
The long-held understanding among security researchers and network defenders is that it's impossible to negotiate in good faith with an extortion racket because there's no incentive for the other side to actually walk away.
Guidelines, not rules. Here's the difference — and why it matters. What is SOLID? SOLID is a set of software design guidelines — not hard rules, but principles that guide how we organize our code. The goal is simple: as your codebase grows and your team scales, things should get easier to change, not harder. SOLID is what makes that possible. Five principles. One goal. Let's walk through each one with real code. S — Single Responsibility Principle A class, function, or method should have one and only one reason to change. The Violation class Bird : def __init__ ( self , name : str , bird_type : str ): self . name = name self . bird_type = bird_type def make_sound ( self ): # two jobs — deciding the type AND making the sound if self . bird_type == " parrot " : print ( " Squawk! " ) elif self . bird_type == " eagle " : print ( " Screech! " ) elif self . bird_type == " owl " : print ( " Hoot! " ) else : print ( " ... " ) make_sound() has two responsibilities — deciding which bird type it is AND making the sound. That's two reasons to change. Add a new bird? Touch make_sound() . Change how sounds work? Touch make_sound() again. Two different reasons, one method. SRP violated. The Fix from abc import ABC , abstractmethod class Bird ( ABC ): def __init__ ( self , name : str ): self . name = name @abstractmethod def make_sound ( self ): pass class Parrot ( Bird ): def make_sound ( self ): print ( " Squawk! " ) class Eagle ( Bird ): def make_sound ( self ): print ( " Screech! " ) class Owl ( Bird ): def make_sound ( self ): print ( " Hoot! " ) # Usage birds = [ Parrot ( " Polly " ), Eagle ( " Sam " ), Owl ( " Oliver " )] for bird in birds : bird . make_sound () Now each class has one responsibility. Parrot.make_sound() only changes if parrots change how they sound. Nothing else touches it. O — Open/Closed Principle A class should be open for extension but closed for modification. SRP and OCP go hand in hand. When you fixed SRP in the Bird example above — you also fixed OCP.
The cybersecurity-focused models, including GPT-5.6 Sol, broke out of a testing sandbox, exploited a zero-day, and gained access to the open internet to pull off the attack.
Sila's fresh $300 million round will help it make enough of its silicon-carbon anode material to power more than 100,000 EVs.
A new type of malware can worm deep into AI coding systems to steal data and logins—and can flip a “death switch” to destroy files and keep out real users.
A hacker took names, phone numbers, and physical addresses of millions of customers who used AI music generator Suno.
Open the network tab on almost any web app, trigger a failed request, and you'll usually find one of two things staring back at the user: a raw stack trace, or a message so generic it might as well say "something happened." Neither one helps. Both exist for the same reason they were written by developers, for developers, and never translated for the person actually using the product. The Error Message Nobody Designed Most UI elements go through some level of design scrutiny. Buttons get spacing decisions. Forms get validation states. But error messages? They're usually whatever string got thrown at the moment something broke, copy-pasted straight from a try/catch block into a toast notification. "Error 500: Internal Server Error." "Failed to fetch." "Unexpected token in JSON at position 4." These are diagnostic breadcrumbs for engineers debugging a system. To a user trying to submit a form or complete a purchase, they're just noise confirmation that something went wrong, with zero indication of what to do next. This is where good web app design services earn their keep not in the buttons and layouts everyone notices, but in the failure states nobody plans for until users start complaining. Why This Keeps Happening It's not that teams don't care. It's that error handling sits at the intersection of two disciplines that rarely talk to each other at the moment. Backend logic throws whatever exception the code produces. The front end just needs something to display so the app doesn't silently freeze. Nobody's job, at that moment, is to ask: "what should the user actually understand right now?" The result is a UI layer that's polished everywhere except the one place users encounter when things go wrong which, ironically, is exactly when clear communication matters most. What a Good Error Message Actually Does A well-designed error message does three things a raw exception never does. It tells the user what happened, in plain language not "Error: NetworkException," but "W