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Hey DEV community, I recently launched bgchanger.video , an AI video background changer for removing or replacing video backgrounds directly in the browser. The idea is simple: many creators, indie hackers, marketers, and product teams need cleaner videos, but traditional editing tools can feel too heavy for quick background cleanup. With bgchanger.video, you can: Upload a video Remove the original background Export with a transparent background Replace the background with a solid color Download the result in formats like MP4, WebM, MOV, MKV, or GIF Keep the original audio when needed I built it for quick workflows like: Product demo videos Social media clips Creator videos Ad creatives Cleaner profile or presentation videos Background cleanup before further editing The current version focuses on making the workflow straightforward: upload, configure, generate, download. I am still improving the product and would love feedback from other builders: Is the workflow clear enough? What export options would you expect? Would you prefer templates, custom background uploads, or batch processing? What would make this useful in your own video workflow? You can try it here: https://bgchanger.video Thanks for checking it out. Feedback is very welcome.

An AI agent does not need to be malicious to damage production. It only needs the wrong tool, the wrong database, the wrong customer ID, or one confident step that nobody checked. That is the uncomfortable part of building agentic features: prompts can suggest safe behavior, but they do not enforce it. If your agent can call tools, write records, send emails, run SQL, trigger workflows, or spend money, you need a deterministic layer between the model and the action. That layer is an AI agent runtime policy system. Think of it as a security checkpoint for every tool call. The model can propose an action. The policy layer decides whether that action is allowed, denied, modified, delayed for approval, or logged for review. This guide is for builders shipping AI features with real customer impact. No vendor pitch. Just architecture, checks, schemas, and mistakes to avoid. Why runtime policy matters now AI products are moving from chat boxes to agents that act. Recent developer signals point in the same direction: agent-first frameworks, AI gateways with spend caps, MCP-style tool registries, human-in-the-loop workflows, and tool authorization experiments. The industry is making it easier to give agents more tools. That creates a new risk. Most apps already check what a human user can do. But agent execution is a chain: user intent -> prompt -> model reasoning -> tool selection -> arguments -> execution -> side effect A normal permission check near the API endpoint is still required, but it does not answer everything: Should the agent attempt this action at all? Does the action match the user's request? Is the target tenant correct? Is the cost acceptable? Does it require approval? Is the agent stuck in a retry loop? Runtime policy answers those questions before execution. What existing AI security content often misses A lot of content explains prompt injection, RAG risks, or broad AI governance. Useful, but builders often need a narrower answer: "My agent is about to ca

What nobody tells you about exporting your multi-agent prototype to a local workspace. Every architect who's prototyped a multi-agent app in Google AI Studio eventually hits the same wall: the prototype works, but it lives in a browser tab. At I/O 2026, Google shipped a fix — Export to Antigravity, a one-click handoff to a local production workspace, carrying "all the context" with it. I ran a real two-agent prototype through it. Here's exactly what survived the trip, what didn't, and what I had to fix by hand — including a bug that had nothing to do with the export itself. 1. The Pilot Project + The Click The project: Research Digest — a sequential two-agent app. Agent 1 (Researcher) takes a topic, uses grounded web search to gather sources. Agent 2 (Editor) synthesizes those findings into a polished digest. Persistence via Firestore, with a history archive of past digests. Built entirely from a single prompt in AI Studio's Build mode . Along the way, provisioning Firestore surfaced my first real gotcha before I even got to the export step — more on that below. Triggering the export: Code tab → Export → Export to Antigravity. The dialog is genuinely informative — it tells you upfront what's coming: all project files, conversation history, and explicitly "1 secret will be included." 2. What Actually Survives the Trip The export dialog's claims, checked one by one: Claimed to transfer What I found All project files ✅ Confirmed — full structure landed intact: .agents, .antigravity, src, config files, README.md with setup instructions Secrets (1 secret) ✅ Confirmed — GEMINI_API_KEY arrived populated in .env, worked immediately, no manual re-entry Conversation history history❌ Did not transfer. The imported "Research Digest" project showed "No conversations yet" in Antigravity's Agent Manager, despite the dialog's explicit promise. Checked twice, on two separate screens — consistent result. 3. The Gotchas Gotcha 1 — "Conversation history will carry over" is currently no

Original Japanese article : Iceberg REST Catalogを直接叩いて、Glue Data CatalogとS3 Tablesの違いを理解する Introduction I'm Aki, an AWS Community Builder ( @jitepengin ). Most of the time, when working with Iceberg tables, we reach for PyIceberg or Spark. I'm no exception, and honestly there were parts of the PyIceberg configuration — rest.sigv4-enabled , rest.signing-name , warehouse — that I understood only vaguely. Iceberg defines a standard called the Iceberg REST Catalog Open API specification , and AWS implements it through two separate endpoints: The AWS Glue Iceberg REST endpoint ( https://glue.<region>.amazonaws.com/iceberg ) The Amazon S3 Tables Iceberg REST endpoint ( https://s3tables.<region>.amazonaws.com/iceberg ) If two implementations follow the same spec, sending the same requests to both and comparing the results should reveal what's actually different between them. In this article, I'll bypass clients like PyIceberg entirely and hit the REST API directly to explore the differences between the two endpoints. To state the conclusion up front: Even though both implement the same Iceberg REST Catalog specification, Glue is designed as an "entry point to multiple catalogs," while S3 Tables is designed as an "entry point to a single table bucket." That difference is visible just by looking at the URL paths. I previously wrote about the relationship between S3 Tables and Glue Data Catalog in another article — worth a read alongside this one: Does Amazon S3 Tables Replace AWS Glue Data Catalog? Understanding Their Relationship What Is the Iceberg REST Catalog? The Iceberg REST Catalog is a specification that standardizes Iceberg catalog operations as an HTTP API. It's published as an OpenAPI definition (YAML), and any catalog that conforms to it can be accessed the same way from clients such as PyIceberg, Spark, and Trino. The key points of the spec are: URL paths follow a pattern like GET /v1/{prefix}/namespaces , where {prefix} is a free-form segment Clients first call

Large language models often develop recurring symbolic patterns — archetypes, metaphors, and memetic shortcuts — that appear across unrelated contexts. One observed example is the repeated emergence of fantasy-based metaphors such as “goblins,” “gremlins,” or similar entities when describing abstract system behavior, errors, or complexity. This article presents a structured analytical trace (A11 framework passes) showing how such patterns emerge from the interaction between reinforcement learning, cultural priors in training data, and user feedback loops. It also explores how introducing explicit interpretability layers can reduce the risk of these symbolic attractors becoming dominant explanatory shortcuts in model behavior. The first A11 pass S1 — Will Understand the causal mechanism: why the “goblin / fantasy drift” emerged in LLMs S2 — Wisdom (constraints) Main pitfall: confusing correlation (goblins appearing in outputs) with causation (why those specific symbols emerge) Also: “goblins” are not a standalone phenomenon they are a case of broader archetypal language drift S3 — Knowledge (what is actually known) There are 5 established mechanisms in LLM behavior: 1. RLHF reinforces “socially engaging metaphors” Models are rewarded for: vividness humor imagery human-like explanations ➡️ fantasy imagery tends to score highly 2. Internet prior already contains strong fantasy culture Training data includes: Reddit gaming discourse D&D culture fanfiction ➡️ “goblin / elf / troll” already exist as: universal behavioral archetypes 3. Compression effect (semantic abstraction) The model seeks compact semantic units: goblin = chaotic / greedy / messy / low-level failure mode ➡️ one token replaces a complex description 4. User feedback loop If the model says: “it’s like a goblin” users: react positively repeat it reinforce it in conversation ➡️ increases probability of reuse 5. Cross-task transfer (persona leakage) Stylistic patterns from: coding assistant mode creative mode

TL;DR: In 2026, the old "cheaper hourly rate vs. more control" framing is outdated. AI-assisted delivery is compressing team size, contracts are shifting from hourly to outcome-based, and onboarding windows have shrunk from months to days. Use staff augmentation when you have strong internal PM capacity and need specific skills for 3-6 months. Use a dedicated team when you're running a 2+ year product and need a self-contained unit with its own PM/QA. Below is a breakdown of the current landscape, including how providers like Toptal-style networks, 6senseHQ , Cleveroad , ScienceSoft , BairesDev , SolveIt , and Uptech fit into each model. Why this decision looks different in 2026 than it did in 2023 Three things changed the calculus this year: AI-assisted engineers ship more per head. Teams are increasingly built around a handful of seniors paired with AI coding assistants rather than a dozen mid-level developers billed by the hour — which makes the traditional "cost per hour" comparison less meaningful than "cost per shipped outcome." Contracts are moving from time-and-materials to outcome-based. Buyers are pushing vendors to tie payment to delivery milestones, not logged hours, partly because AI tooling makes hour-counting a weaker proxy for value. Onboarding windows collapsed. Several dedicated-team providers now quote 3-7 day ramp-up instead of the 2-4 week window that was standard a few years ago, which narrows the traditional "augmentation is faster to start" advantage. None of this changes the fundamental difference between the two models. It changes how much each one costs you in practice. The core difference, restated simply Staff augmentation : you hire individual engineers who join your team, use your tools, and report to your leads. You manage the work. Dedicated team : you hire a self-contained unit (engineers + QA + a PM/lead) that runs its own delivery process. You manage the roadmap, they manage the mechanics. The break-even point most guides converge

You've seen the alert. You've opened the PR. You've read the changelog. Then you realize: your code doesn't even call the vulnerable function. Every week. Hundreds of teams drowning in CVE notifications for packages sitting dormant in their node_modules — dependencies they pulled in years ago, bundled by a transitive library, and never actually executed. Meanwhile, the real vulnerabilities get buried. VigilOps is a free Node.js CLI that fixes this. How VigilOps Works VigilOps does three things: Scans dependencies against OSV.dev — the open vulnerability database used by GitHub, PyPI, and npm Runs static reachability analysis to filter out unreachable vulnerabilities (packages in your tree but never called by your code) Auto-opens a GitHub PR with the fix The result: you get one PR with one real vulnerability. Not a spreadsheet. Not a wall of Slack messages. A fix. Demo Here's a quick scan: npx vigilops scan examples/vigilops-demo-lodash And to see everything including suppressed (unreachable) deps: npx vigilops scan examples/vigilops-demo-express --all The --all flag shows what's in your dependency tree but not actually reachable from your code. That's what the noise looks like — and that's what VigilOps filters out. Why This Is Different Dependabot and Snyk scan your entire lockfile. They report every CVE in every package, regardless of whether your code ever touches the vulnerable surface. This creates alert fatigue that causes teams to eventually... stop reading. VigilOps inverts the model: only surface vulnerabilities in code you actually call. Dependabot: "Your project has 47 vulnerabilities" (but 40 are unreachable noise) VigilOps: "Your project has 1 reachable vulnerability. PR is ready." Quick Start npm install -g vigilops npx vigilops scan . Authenticate with GitHub: https://github.com/Vigilops/vigilops npx vigilops auth That's it. The first run will scan, analyze, and open a PR if there's a fixable reachable vulnerability. What's Included OSV.dev integrati

While doing a routine hardening pass on an internal Firebase panel — codename PanelControl , a management tool used daily by multiple operators with different roles — what was supposed to be "let's add a few Telegram alerts for suspicious activity" turned into discovering that the app's entire login system was just a UI filter. Anyone who opened the site already had, automatically, a Firebase identity with full read/write access to the database. Here's what happened, and how it got fixed in 5 phases without ever locking the team out mid-shift. The setup PanelControl is a vanilla-JS internal panel backed by Firebase Realtime Database + Firestore. Operators log in with email/password, checked client-side against a database node, with a lockout after failed attempts. Nothing unusual so far. The original ask was narrow: add Telegram notifications for a handful of suspicious events — brute-force attempts, a never-before-seen device for an operator, an unauthorized attempt to reach the Admin section, DevTools opened during use. Pure alerting work. Bug #1: the login button that always unlocks Before writing any alerting logic, a review of the existing Admin-area password check turned up this: // ❌ The "|| true" makes the whole condition always truthy function checkAdminPwd () { if ( el . value || true ) { unlockAdmin (); // runs regardless of what's typed, or nothing at all } } A debug leftover that made it to production. Anyone who landed on the Admin password overlay got in by clicking "Log in" — password or not. Fixed by actually wiring the real permission check, plus a server-side-verified fallback in case the function were ever called directly from the console. The real discovery: a shared, hardcoded Firebase credential Looking at the Realtime Database Rules ahead of the alerting work surfaced something much bigger. The Rules restricted read/write to a single fixed auth.uid — reasonable, until you check who actually gets that uid . This ran unconditionally, for every

A surprise 10th-anniversary event saw Niantic fulfilling a promise teased in the original 2016 launch trailer for its popular mobile game.

GitHub热门项目 | YouTube到AcFun和bilibili自动化搬运工具，支持AI翻译、字幕生成、内容审核、智能监控 | Stars: 1,535 | 211 stars today | 语言: Python