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Episode 1/4 — 3 incidents, one root: default GRANTs open more than you think — [CANONICAL URL EPISODE 1: fill in after push] Episode 2/4 — await mutation() lies when nobody opens the { error } envelope — [CANONICAL URL EPISODE 2: fill in after push] The morning Françoise sees zero rows, again It's a Tuesday in April 2026. I've just added the agent_readonly role to the authenticated membership — a one-liner, meant to share a GRANT for a reporting job. First SELECT on cours , Sentry receives infinite recursion detected in policy for relation "user_roles" , code 42P17 . From the office next door, Françoise is already on the phone with the Maisons-Laffitte branch: "So they can't see anything over there — is that normal?" Foreman tone, not really a question. I read the error on my screen. The difference from episode 1: this time Postgres is talking. What came out of Sentry was no longer a silent empty set — it was an explicit error. That difference saved me two days. When Postgres shouts, you listen. The trap is that what it says isn't where you're looking. I won't pretend this is obscure. A policy on user_roles that queries user_roles to decide who can read user_roles is a loop. You avoid it, you work around it with SECURITY DEFINER , you move on. The problem: my user_roles policy didn't reference user_roles . I had already cleaned it up three weeks earlier. The recursion was coming from somewhere else. The diagnostic that targets the wrong object First reflex: re-read the user_roles policy. It's clean, reads auth.email() , never calls itself. Second reflex: disable policies one by one to find the culprit. Wrong angle. -- supabase/migrations/20260420_admin_write_cours_v1.sql -- "Admin write cours" policy — original version that loops CREATE POLICY "Admin write cours" ON public . cours FOR ALL TO authenticated USING ( EXISTS ( SELECT 1 FROM public . user_roles WHERE email = auth . email () AND role IN ( 'admin' , 'super_admin' ) ) ); The recursion doesn't come from a fau

The fourth call of the week Catherine calls from the Maisons-Laffitte site on a Tuesday afternoon in early May. "It's broken, but it's a quick fix." That's her line — I know it, and she's usually right. She describes it in three sentences: the newsletter export for the enrolled-students segment comes back with ninety-two names, the planning view shows ninety-two active courses, but the counter page shows eighty-nine. Three enrolled students missing. She'd checked the database directly — they're all there. "Why three steps for that?" She's not asking for my benefit. She's asking for herself. Except this time, hanging up, I realize it's the fourth time this week I've hung up thinking the same thing. Four Supabase incidents, four fixes, four closed tickets. And not a single exception raised by the database. I reopen the three previous ones and lay all four side by side on screen. This isn't four bugs. It's one failure mode, declinated four times. The first three Episode 1 was about the default GRANT s Supabase places on functions and policies. A SQL function created without an explicit REVOKE inherits anon access that nobody wrote in the migration, and that nobody caught in review because the diff doesn't show it. The function works. It's just callable from outside. [CANONICAL URL EPISODE 1: to fill in after publication of #48 — "3 Supabase security incidents, one shared root cause: SECURITY DEFINER inherits EXECUTE TO PUBLIC"] Episode 2, an ON DELETE SET NULL cascade coupled with a CHECK NOT NULL on the target column. The parent DELETE attempts the SET NULL , the CHECK rejects it, and the transaction surfaces an error we read as a deletion failure — while it actually masks a consistency assumption we'd held for three months. The query fails loudly, which is more charitable than the other three cases, but the diagnosis heads in the wrong direction because nobody had declared that the two constraints lived in tension. [CANONICAL URL EPISODE 2: to fill in after publicati

The request was eight words Monday morning. I open the outgoing email queue: six hundred and forty-seven drafts waiting, six hundred and seventy-two sent. Nobody clicks Send . First-contact emails are prepared by a pipeline and they sleep, because the last step assumes a human. That human, I had stopped believing she would have the time. I state the decision: automate sending . The response comes in seconds. Three levels of automation. Four channels. Three risk thresholds. All correct, all fit for a half-day architecture workshop. I had not asked for a workshop. Pauline walks behind me, glances at the screen, says nothing. Three timed reframes First reframe , brief: too strange, let's simplify . The agent drops two axes, keeps four residual layers, progressive warm-up over three weeks, deterministic anti-replay hash, configuration table in the database, manual Phase 1 followed by an automated Phase 2 to validate after two weeks of measurement. The target stays the same, that an email leaves without a human click. The path has grown accordingly. Second reframe , drier: simple, three safeguards, a kill-switch, we do this in one day . The agent re-architects, accepts the one-day target, keeps the three safeguards. But slips in three prostheses it calls industry standard : real-time dashboard, exponential retry, structured audit log in a new table. Each justifiable in isolation. None of them requested. Third reframe , shorter still: I don't understand why you're adding this . An opening line almost embarrassed, which I had never read from it before: "you're right, I'm over-engineering without necessity." And the version that should have arrived on the first round. A function that takes the draft record, checks three conditions, calls the send engine, returns. // lib/email-outbox.ts — generateFirstContactDraft (commit 3756e63) if ( ! EMAIL_REGEX . test ( input . email )) { return { success : false , error : ' email_invalide ' } } if ( BLACKLIST_EMAILS . has ( input . ema

TL;DR Three unrelated repos, one recurring theme: derive from a single source of truth instead of duplicating it. Shipped a registry-driven sidebar section switcher (public), converged a multi-system password flow, and pushed on a customer-data identity engine. Details on the first two live in their own posts today. 1. Registry-driven sidebar switcher (public) Added a section switcher to the kickoff starter kit. The sidebar, the switcher, and breadcrumbs all read the same config/menu.php list, and the active section is picked by longest URL-prefix match — so a detail page like /admin/roles/42/edit keeps its parent selected. Full write-up in the focused post. 2. One canonical password flow Converged two apps that each rolled their own password-change/reset logic onto a single shared engine, with a fixed order (directory → external DB → local app) and no config-toggle to skip backends. A password that syncs to some systems is worse than one that fails outright, so partial success is now impossible by construction. Also fixed a subtle status bug — an unreachable backend reports skipped (a runtime fact), not disabled (a config state that no longer exists) — and added an audit log so "did it sync?" is a query, not a guess. Separate post today goes deeper. 3. Identity resolution engine (customer data work) Steady progress on a CDP-style identity layer: an idempotent, header-versioned ingest endpoint that queues incoming records, then a resolution engine that can resolve, merge, unmerge, and quarantine profiles. Two things I care about here: PII handling: sensitive identifiers are encrypted at rest with a blind index for lookups, and masked in audit trails — you can search on a value without storing it in the clear. Right-to-erasure: an erasure cascade plus an erasure log, so a deletion request actually propagates and leaves a defensible record that it did. ingest -> queue -> resolve -> profile | +-> merge / unmerge / quarantine No code from this one here — it's teaching t

TL;DR Two apps each had their own password-change/reset logic, plus config toggles to enable/disable backends. That combination quietly allowed partial syncs. Fix: one shared engine, one canonical order , backends mandatory (no config-disable), and every attempt written to an audit log. Lesson: for a write that spans several systems, "configurable steps" is a footgun. Make the flow fixed and make failure loud. The setup A user changes their password. Behind the scenes that single password has to land in several systems — a directory, an external database, and the app's own store. Two separate apps were doing this, each with slightly different code, and each with config flags like sync_oracle => true|false to turn backends on and off. Sounds flexible. It's actually a trap. Why configurable backends are a footgun TL;DR: a password that updates 2 of 3 systems is worse than one that updates none — because now the systems disagree and nobody gets an error. The moment a backend is optionally skippable, "skipped" and "failed" blur together. Someone flips a flag in one environment, forgets it in another, and now prod and staging run different flows. Debugging a login failure means first reverse-engineering which steps actually ran. Before After Each app had its own reset logic One shared engine, both apps call it Backends toggle via config Backends are mandatory, always run Order implicit / differed per app One canonical order: New directory → external DB → local app "Did it sync?" answered by guessing Every attempt logged with per-service status The canonical order The order isn't cosmetic. It runs most-authoritative-first, so if a downstream step fails you haven't already told the user their new password works. change/reset request | v [ New Directory ] --ok--> [ External DB ] --ok--> [ Local App store ] | | | fail fail fail | | | +----> stop, record per-service status, surface the failure Same engine, same order, both apps. A change API and a reset flow are just two entr

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Hey HN! We built a browser-based agent that runs inside an authenticated web app, watches how the app calls its own APIs, and automatically turns those into agent tools. You can think of it as an auto-generated MCP server that self-updates as the host app changes. The result is a skilled AI assistant that actually integrates deeply with any product (not just chat and RAG) with minimal effort. Check out these short demos below that show the agent in software you're probably familiar with: - Jira:

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Oddly, it wasn't the first time this had happened to the man.

We're open-sourcing Sighthound today, our rules-based static security scanner. What makes it special is that it's coded in rust and uses tree-sitter as it's AST making it very fast and easily extensible. Why build another scanner in 2026? We wanted to improve some of our detection outcomes but noticed the current open source scanners like Semgrep/Opengrep we're capped by a bunch of adoption limitations such as being written in OCaml, requiring a lot of work to add a language parser, and the rule

Hi Hacker News, I’m Yahia. I built Context.dev ( https://www.context.dev/ ) to make it really easy to integrate web data into your products and agents. Here’s a demo video: https://www.tella.tv/video/build-faster-with-context-dev-api... Since it’s an API, here are the docs: https://docs.context.dev/quickstart . You can send us a URL and get back clean Markdown, rendered HTML, screenshots, extracted images, etc.. You can also send us a domain and get company or brand context: name, description, l

Show HN: Runtime authorization for Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex Hi HN, Fernando and I built Kastra. Kastra intercepts AI agent tool calls and evaluates them against deterministic policies before they execute. This is aimed at developers using coding agents like Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and OpenClaw. We built Kastra after one of our Cursor agents almost executed DELETE FROM customers WHERE status='test' against a production database. We caught it before it ran, but it made us realize that no

Raj Ummadisetty and Ken Kurzweil share Netflix's architectural pivot to CloudStream, a repeatable capture, conversion, and deployment framework. They discuss shifting key-value abstractions from stateless to stateful to move terabytes of bulk data safely. Software architects will learn to exploit data access patterns, use "Pathfinder" prototypes, and maintain a 99% faster rollout. By Rajasekhar Ummadisetty, Ken Kurzweil