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An AI agent that reproduces GitHub issues for you Discussion | Link

The man whose Tesla struck and killed a woman inside her Texas home last month is now facing manslaughter charges, as reported earlier by The Wall Street Journal and local news outlet KHOU 11. 44-year-old Michael Butler was arrested on Wednesday and claimed to have been driving his Model 3 using Tesla's Full-Self Driving (FSD) […]

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Selby's VC firm Copper Sky Capital is currently raising a $300 million second fund, according to a regulatory filing.

Three months ago, the idea of an AI agent earning money autonomously was a thought experiment. Today, it's a $0-budget repo on GitHub. AIA — Autonomous Insight Agent is what I shipped this week. It's an LLM agent that: Collects signal from 6 free public APIs every 6 hours (Hacker News, GitHub trending, V2EX, dev.to, Lobsters, HN Algolia) Curates 100+ raw items down to 40 ranked, topic-tagged, de-duped entries using deterministic scoring (recency × source weight × topic boost × negative penalty) Publishes a free public dashboard at https://razel369.github.io/aia/ Exposes a paid x402 API at https://aia-x402.rmalka06.workers.dev — USDC on Base, no KYC, no API key, the HTTP 402 status code IS the payment request Auto-bids on agent marketplace jobs (MoltJobs) where AIA fits — research, data, competitive intel Fulfills accepted jobs autonomously — generates a research report from the latest feed, submits via the same API Why x402 matters The x402 protocol (Coinbase, https://x402.org ) revives the long-reserved HTTP 402 Payment Required status code as a real machine-to-machine payment primitive. The flow: Agent → GET /v1/signals → 402 + PAYMENT-REQUIRED header → Agent signs a USDC payment to my wallet → Agent retries with PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header → 200 OK + PAYMENT-RESPONSE header + signal JSON No Stripe, no accounts, no monthly subscriptions. Pay $0.01 USDC per call, instantly settled on Base. The agent consumer never has to ask a human to buy credits. Why this is novel Most "data feeds" today are static dumps or human-curated. AIA is the first agent-curated, agent-paid-for, agent-consumed stream. The LLM layer IS the moat — anyone can scrape HN, but de-noising, de-duping, and topic-classifying 100+ items into 40 ranked signals in 17 seconds is the actual product. The killer line in my dev plan: every job AIA accepts on MoltJobs can be fulfilled by calling its own paid endpoint. The agent pays for its own LLM compute via marketplace earnings — a positive feedback loop tha

Book: Decoupled PHP — Clean and Hexagonal Architecture for Applications That Outlive the Framework Also by me: Thinking in Go (2-book series) — Complete Guide to Go Programming + Hexagonal Architecture in Go My project: Hermes IDE | GitHub — an IDE for developers who ship with Claude Code and other AI coding tools Me: xgabriel.com | GitHub You wire a listener to Eloquent's saved event on the Order model. When an order is saved, send the confirmation email. It works in the demo. Then a support ticket lands: a customer got two confirmation emails for one purchase, and another got a refund receipt for an order that was never refunded. You dig in. The double email came from a background job that touched updated_at on the order to bump a cache. The bogus receipt came from an admin editing the shipping address, which saved the model, which fired saved , which ran a listener that assumed "saved means the order changed state." None of that was the customer's intent. All of it was persistence. That's the whole problem in one sentence. saved tells you a row hit the database. It does not tell you what happened in your business. What Eloquent events actually fire on Eloquent dispatches creating , created , updating , updated , saving , saved , deleting , deleted , and a few more. Every one of them is tied to a persistence operation on a single model. They fire because you called save() , update() , create() , or delete() , not because a business rule was satisfied. Here is the shape most teams start with: <?php namespace App\Models ; use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Model ; class Order extends Model { protected static function booted (): void { static :: updated ( function ( Order $order ): void { // "the order changed, email the customer" OrderMailer :: confirmation ( $order ); }); } } The listener assumes updated means "something the customer cares about changed." It doesn't. updated fires for any dirty column: a cached counter, a nightly touch() , an admin fixing a typo in t

Fable 5 got jailbroken again Researcher Vitto Rivabella tested Fable 5’s defenses and managed to find a bypass. According to him, most attempts failed. The protection is multi-layered: the model checks the prompt, conversation history, system context, and its own response. Some filters run during generation and can stop the answer halfway through. The checks are not based on keywords. The system looks at meaning, intent, language, wording, and suspicious chains of requests. The bypass took around 20 hours. It required rare languages, academic framing, long build-ups, Unicode, breaking the task into parts, and working with the chain of thought. The author did not get a stable bypass for long tasks. According to him, regular search is faster and cheaper.

Linux LUKS Vulnerability, Android Developer Verification Threat, GitHub Secret Scanning Guide Today's Highlights This week's top security news features a critical data leakage bug in Linux LUKS disk encryption, a deceptive new threat leveraging Android developer verification, and GitHub's practical guide to managing secret scanning alerts at scale. These stories highlight the ongoing challenges in OS hardening, mobile supply chain defense, and secrets management. Linux 6.9 LUKS Suspend Bug Leaves Encryption Keys in Memory (Hacker News) Source: https://mathstodon.xyz/@iblech/116769502749142438 A critical vulnerability has been identified in Linux kernels since version 6.9, where Logical Unit Key (LUKS) disk encryption keys are no longer reliably wiped from memory when a system enters suspend mode. This flaw means that after resuming from suspend, or even during a 'cold boot' attack, a sophisticated attacker with physical access could potentially extract the disk encryption keys directly from the system's RAM. Prior to this, LUKS was designed to clear these sensitive keys, providing a layer of protection against memory forensics attacks. The issue fundamentally undermines the security posture of LUKS-encrypted systems that rely on suspend functionality. It poses a significant risk for users and organizations handling sensitive data on laptops or any device where physical access by an adversary is a concern. The practical implication is that suspending a Linux 6.9+ system with LUKS encryption may no longer be a secure operation, forcing users to fully shut down their machines to ensure key erasure. Mitigation strategies include avoiding suspend, reverting to an earlier kernel version if feasible, or diligently monitoring for official patches addressing this severe data leakage vector. Comment: This is a serious regression impacting fundamental data at rest security for Linux users, especially on laptops. If you use LUKS, avoid suspend on Linux 6.9+ until a fix is verif

Maintaining a robust testing pipeline or managing automated node infrastructure often requires orchestrating dozens of isolated EVM wallets. Over time, these automated Python or JavaScript configurations inevitably hit a common wall: the accumulation of fragmented token dust across multiple layers (Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BSC, etc.). Trying to clear these micro-balances manually or writing one-off scripts to sweep individual assets scale operational costs rapidly. Each network requires separate RPC updates, custom middleware logic, and redundant gas overhead, turning standard infrastructure hygiene into an engineering bottleneck. The Problem with Traditional Asset Sweeping When handling larger developer setups or wallet clusters, custom scripts face three major friction points: Redundant Network Fees: Batching transfers without native contract-level optimization burns excessive gas when scaling to 50+ addresses. RPC Disruption: Constantly querying and broadcasting batch transfers via public or even shared private endpoints can trigger rate limits. Data Contamination: Manually routing funds from dense testing nodes increases the risk of cluster cross-contamination. To resolve this friction within our decentralized dev pipelines, we deployed a streamlined utility layer: CryptonEquity Terminal ( https://cryptonequity.com ). Building a Unified Utility Layer for Multi-Chain Workflows The terminal introduces a non-custodial Cross-Chain Dust Sweeper designed to eliminate fragmented operational friction. Instead of manually deploying individual sweeping scripts per account, the infrastructure automates multi-chain scanning and groups asset consolidation into a single transaction link. Simultaneous Layer Aggregation: Automatically detects micro-balances across dominant EVM networks at once. Gas Mitigation: Designed to structure transfer paths to limit redundant network fee overhead. Zero Onboarding Friction: Operating strictly on a non-custodial architecture, it requires n

The original safety gate on the Dolt-over-MCP plugin tried to keep a Claude Code agent harmless by excluding "history-affecting tools" from its MCP grant. It was the wrong granularity, and it did nothing. MCP exposes the entire database through one tool — query / exec — and that tool carries every SQL verb. SELECT rides it. So does CALL DOLT_PUSH , CALL DOLT_RESET('--hard') , DROP DATABASE , and CALL DOLT_BRANCH('-D', 'main') . Excluding "dangerous tools" from the grant accomplishes nothing, because the dangerous verbs live inside the one tool you already granted. The destructive operations were never separate tools to exclude. This is the reframe the whole Phase 0 hardening pass turned on: a tool-name allowlist is meaningless for any tool that carries a sub-language. SQL is a sub-language. So is the shell behind a Bash tool. So is anything behind an eval . If the tool can run arbitrary statements in some grammar, the only boundary that means anything is one that reads the statement. It is the move from tool-name allowlisting to capability-based security: the grant stops being "you may call the query tool" and becomes "you may run these statement classes inside it." Why not just allowlist the safe tools? Because there is exactly one tool, and it is not safe or unsafe — it is whatever statement you hand it. You cannot partition a single door into a safe door and a dangerous door by naming. The same logic kills the next-obvious fix: a denylist of dangerous verbs. Blacklist DOLT_PUSH , DOLT_RESET , DROP ... and miss DOLT_REBASE , or the proc Dolt ships next quarter, or a CALL whose name your regex didn't anticipate. A denylist is only as good as your imagination on the day you wrote it. The fix inverts that. You add safety by enumerating what is safe, not by blacklisting what is dangerous. Anything you cannot positively classify as safe is treated as the most dangerous thing it could be. Default-deny the unknown. It's least privilege applied to a grammar: the agent get

The Quest Begins (The "Why") I still remember the first time I faced a problem that asked for the sum of numbers in a sub‑array, over and over again, with updates sprinkled in between. It felt like I was stuck in a never‑ending loop of for i in range(l, r+1): total += arr[i] – O(n) per query, and with up to 10⁵ queries the solution timed out every single time. I was staring at the screen, thinking, “There has to be a smarter way to answer these range questions without scanning the whole array each time.” That moment was my dragon: a seemingly simple problem that kept biting me because I kept reaching for the brute‑force sword. I needed a data structure that could give me the answer in logarithmic time while still supporting point updates. Enter the segment tree – the tool that turned my O(n·q) nightmare into an O((n+q)·log n) victory. The Revelation (The Insight) So why does a segment tree work? Imagine you have an array and you want to know the sum of any interval [l, r] . If you could break that interval into a handful of pre‑computed chunks, you’d only need to add those chunk values together instead of touching every element. A segment tree is exactly that: a binary tree where each node stores the aggregate (sum, min, max, etc.) of a segment of the original array. The root covers the whole array [0, n‑1] . Its two children cover the left half and the right half, and this keeps splitting until the leaves represent single elements. The magic lies in two facts: Every node’s value is a function of its children. If you know the sum of the left child and the sum of the right child, the parent’s sum is just their addition. This means we can build the tree bottom‑up in O(n) time. Any interval can be represented as O(log n) disjoint nodes. When you walk down the tree to answer [l, r] , you either take a whole node (if its segment lies completely inside the query) or you recurse further. Because the tree’s height is log₂n, you’ll visit at most 2·log₂n nodes. Thus, building

Mozilla shut down the well-loved read-it-later Pocket app last year, and now Meta is launching an app called Pocket with an entirely different, AI-focused pitch: this new app lets you make and share little interactive "gizmos" built from an AI prompt, as reported by Business Insider. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg is all in on AI […]