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The window is almost shut. On August 19, eight startups will take the stage at Stripe Tour Sydney in front of investors, global press, and the Australian tech community. One startup walks away with automatic entry into TechCrunch Disrupt in San Francisco — no application, no further competition, a guaranteed spot on the world’s most […]

Databricks has remade its image into an AI company and has published research on the cost savings of open weight AI models for coding.

Food producer Taylor Farms released a statement on the Cyclospora outbreak Friday, confirming that it's "voluntarily removing all iceberg lettuce sourced from central Mexico from the US market." Reuters reports that, according to a source, Taylor Farms told customers like Yum Brands owner Taco Bell and the food distributor Sysco on Thursday to pull shredded […]

The API is supposed to deliver posts from 'the highest-ranking Truth Social accounts.'

Agentic click tracking that shows what grows your business Discussion | Link

Several posts ago, I wrote about setting up a multi-agent adversarial code review process as part of my development pipeline. The premise came from a podcast: if one frontier model is writing the code, you want a different lineage model doing the review. I'd already been running an informal version of this: just Claude Code reviewing Claude Code with an adversarial prompt. It had shockingly good luck catching real problems. Good enough that I stopped trusting the vibe and decided to go get actual data. So here's what I set up. Claude Code wrote the PRs. Every PR got reviewed automatically by 2 reviewers running in parallel through GitHub Actions: Claude Code with an adversarial prompt and Gemini with an adversarial prompt. I read everything myself. Then the same Claude Code agent that had written most of the PRs pulled both reviewers' feedback locally and distilled it into a scored ledger, PR by PR, for 6 weeks. Wiring Claude Code to review PRs through a GitHub Action was trivial. Wiring Gemini up the same way was not. Claude Code could not figure out how to get the Gemini CLI working inside a GitHub Action, and I ended up installing the Gemini CLI locally and having it perform the wiring. A couple of weeks into collecting data, I noticed Gemini's reviews were shallow. Not wrong, exactly. Thin. I started wondering whether Gemini actually had read access to the repository or whether it was only ever seeing the diff it was handed. I checked. It was the diff. Just the diff. Nothing but the diff. No file reads, no git history, nothing. And the thing that configured the GitHub Action in the first place was Gemini. It set up its own blindfold. I fixed it and Gemini's reviews got worse. Not louder or more frequent. Worse in a specific way: more confident. Before the fix, a blind Gemini would correctly tell you that it couldn't verify something and to check manually. That's an honest failure mode. After the fix, once it could actually read the code, it started fabricating.

The most expensive thing you can do with an AI agent is watch it. Not audit it. Not review its output. Watch it -- step by step, approval by approval, second-guessing every action before it takes the next one. And yet that is precisely how most engineering teams are deploying AI agents in 2026: on a leash so short the agent cannot take three steps without a human tapping it on the shoulder. I understand why. The models hallucinate. The stakes are real. Nobody wants to be the engineering manager who let an AI agent push a bad migration to production at 2am. So we wrap the agents in confirmation dialogs, require human sign-off at every branch point, and celebrate our careful governance. What we have actually built is an automation system that requires more human attention than the manual process it replaced. The better answer is not more control at the action level. It is better design at the intent level. Steer by intent, monitor by exception. Tell the agent clearly what outcome you need, what it must never do, and what constitutes a result worth stopping for. Then let it work. Watch the outcomes, not the steps. We have built automation systems that require more human attention than the manual process they replaced. That is not a governance success. That is a design failure. Why we got here The model for human-AI collaboration that most teams are using today was inherited from the model for junior developer supervision. You review every pull request. You approve every deployment. You sign off on every schema change. That model exists because junior developers are learning, because their mental models are incomplete, because their judgment has not yet been earned. Applied to AI agents, it assumes the same thing: the agent is a novice that needs supervision. But an AI agent is not a junior developer. It does not have an incomplete mental model of the codebase that will improve with mentorship. It has exactly the mental model you gave it via its context, its tools, and

Two nights before a chemistry final, I pasted my notes into an AI quiz generator to test myself. One question asked about a reaction I never studied. I got it wrong, looked it up afterward, and it wasn't in my notes at all. The tool had just made it up. I went looking for a better one and hit the same wall three more times with three different tools. Paste your notes, get a quiz, and somewhere in the output is a question built on a fact your source material never mentioned. Nobody flags it. You just find out when you're wrong about something you were sure you'd studied. The failure mode makes sense once you think about how these tools are built. Most of them prompt an LLM with something like "generate 10 quiz questions from this text" and print whatever comes back. The model is good at sounding right. It is not naturally good at staying inside the boundary of what you actually gave it, and a prompt that says "don't hallucinate" is a request, not a constraint. The model can ignore it and you'd never know from the output alone. So I built QuizPaste around a different idea: don't ask the model to be honest, check it. When it generates a question, it has to also point at the sentence in your source text the question came from. Before that question ever gets shown to you, the code tries to actually locate that sentence in your original text. If it can't find it (wrong wording, a made-up detail, or the line just isn't there), the question gets thrown out silently and never reaches you. You only ever see questions the tool can prove came from your own material. Open any question and you can see the exact line highlighted. Using it is the boring part, on purpose. Paste lecture notes or a block of text, or grab a YouTube video's transcript (open the video, three dots, "Show transcript," copy the panel text, paste it in). There's no scraping involved, so it doesn't break when YouTube changes something on their end. You get a practice quiz plus flashcards in about five seconds

The most important SaaS workflows rarely stay inside one clean browser tab. A user starts on the application, opens an OAuth popup, completes MFA, returns to the original tab, receives an email, follows a verification link, and lands on a different domain. Their account belongs to one tenant, their data is stored in a particular region, and their locale changes the date format that the test expected. Each step may work in isolation. The complete journey still fails. That is why testing SaaS applications requires more than a collection of page-level tests. The real risk lives in the handoffs between systems, identities, windows, tenants, regions, and communication channels. Authentication is a state machine, not a login form A simple login test usually covers one path: Enter email and password. Submit. Reach the dashboard. Real authentication has many branches: OAuth consent already granted. OAuth consent required. Popup blocked. Identity provider opens in a new tab. MFA requested. MFA remembered on the device. Session expired during the handoff. User belongs to multiple organizations. Original tab resumes before the token is available. Callback lands on the wrong environment. This review of testing OAuth popups, MFA prompts, and cross-tab login handoffs with Endtest highlights the operational difficulty of these flows. Model authentication as a state machine. Record the expected transitions and test the failure paths between them. For example: Unauthenticated → OAuth opened → Provider authenticated → Callback received → Session created → Tenant selected → Application ready A test that only checks the last page cannot tell you where the handoff failed. Capture: Current window and newly opened windows. Redirect URLs and callback parameters. Cookie and storage changes. Network failures during token exchange. Visible provider errors. The tenant selected after authentication. Whether the original tab updates automatically or requires refresh. Multi-tenant testing must pr

AI-powered web applications look familiar on the surface. They have text boxes, buttons, menus, loading indicators, and API calls. That makes it tempting to test them like any other web application: submit an input, wait for a response, and compare the output with an expected string. That approach breaks quickly. Model output is variable. Safety behavior depends on context. A response can be semantically correct but displayed in the wrong conversation. An agent can produce a convincing final message after calling the wrong tool. A prompt-injection defense can block obvious attacks while failing when malicious instructions arrive through a webpage, document, image, or previous message. Testing these applications requires two kinds of evidence at the same time: Deterministic product evidence: the UI, state, permissions, tool calls, and workflow behaved correctly. Probabilistic model evidence: the output stayed within an acceptable range across repeated and adversarial inputs. Prompt injection is a workflow problem Prompt injection testing is often reduced to pasting “ignore previous instructions” into a chat box. That is a useful smoke test, but it does not represent how browser-based agents encounter untrusted content. An agent may read instructions from: A webpage. A support ticket. A PDF. A hidden DOM node. An email. A retrieved knowledge-base entry. A tool response. A previous conversation turn. The guide on testing prompt injection defenses in AI-powered browser workflows provides a good foundation. The test should verify more than the final sentence. It should inspect whether the agent: Treated external content as data rather than authority. Attempted a prohibited tool call. Exposed secrets in an intermediate step. Navigated to an unapproved domain. Changed its goal after reading untrusted content. Requested confirmation before a sensitive action. Preserved the original user instruction. A safe final answer does not prove that the workflow was safe. The agent ma