标签：#ia

It's pretty annoying that Codex uses agents.md and Claude Code uses Claude.md. There should be some industry standards to this stuff? submitted by /u/Complete-Sea6655 [link] [留言]

"We look forward to working with Roscosmos on a collaborative approach to address the leaks."

SpaceX won’t get easy access to billions of dollars from passive investors.

been building agent infrastructure for a while and this is one of the messiest edge cases i keep seeing. most agent setups use a shared mailbox. works fine for one agent. breaks badly at scale. what goes wrong: - two agents poll the same inbox simultaneously - both read the same OTP email - one executes, one silently fails or retries on a expired code - no error surfaced to the orchestrator the fix isn't complicated but it's not obvious either. each agent needs its own dedicated inbox with isolated read locks. when agent A claims an email, agent B can't see it. this also means your deliverability reputation stays clean — you're not blasting from one shared identity. the other pattern that helps: long-poll on inbound instead of polling on a schedule. you fire GET /inbox/wait and it blocks until the email arrives (or times out). no cron, no missed messages between poll windows. curious how others are handling multi-agent email scenarios — shared inbox with locking, or fully isolated per-agent inboxes? submitted by /u/kumard3 [link] [留言]

Developer felt "beaten up," with "no choice" but to shrink data center.

If you build, run, or audit systems that touch protected health information (PHI), the HIPAA risk assessment is the document that quietly decides whether the next OCR investigation ends in a closure letter or a corrective action plan with a six-figure settlement. The proposed 2026 HIPAA Security Rule update (published as an NPRM in January 2025, still pending finalization at OCR) doesn't change the underlying requirement at 45 CFR § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) — and OCR has repeatedly reaffirmed that the absence of a current, written risk analysis is itself the most-frequently-cited Security Rule deficiency . This is the engineering view: what a defensible HIPAA risk assessment actually contains in 2026, how to model it, and what tooling fits the workflow. 1. The asset inventory is non-negotiable Every defensible HIPAA risk assessment starts with a complete inventory of where ePHI lives, where it flows, and who touches it. If you can't enumerate every system, every integration, and every workforce role that creates / receives / maintains / transmits ePHI, the rest of the assessment is built on sand. A minimal asset-inventory record per system: { "system_id" : "ehr-prod-01" , "system_type" : "ehr" , "ephi_states" : [ "create" , "receive" , "maintain" , "transmit" ], "data_classification" : "phi-high" , "hosting" : { "type" : "saas" , "vendor" : "epic" , "region" : "us-east-1" }, "workforce_roles_with_access" : [ "clinician" , "billing" , "admin" ], "integrations" : [ { "to" : "billing-system" , "protocol" : "hl7-fhir" , "direction" : "outbound" }, { "to" : "patient-portal" , "protocol" : "https-rest" , "direction" : "bidirectional" } ], "encryption_at_rest" : true , "encryption_in_transit" : true , "mfa_enforced" : true , "audit_log_destination" : "central-siem" , "ba_agreement_on_file" : true , "last_reviewed" : "2026-05-15" } If you don't have this, build it before you do anything else. The HHS-provided ONC SRA Tool walks through asset enumeration but it's optimized for s

Who governs AI agents once they're running in production? I went looking for the answer. It's more complicated than the press releases suggest. This week Cognizant and ServiceNow announced a partnership specifically to close what they're calling the "enforcement gap" in enterprise AI governance. The Everest Group analyst quote from the press release cuts to it: "The hard part of AI governance was never writing the policy. It's enforcing it as systems learn and act." Here's what the enforcement actually looks like. In May, ServiceNow connected AI Control Tower to Amazon Bedrock AgentCore — a single governance layer over every AI agent an enterprise builds on AWS. Cognizant then deploys "Guardian agents" that monitor AI behavior in real time and enforce responsible AI principles throughout the lifecycle. Agents are being governed by other agents. Guardian agents watch the AI agents. The question the press releases don't answer: who watches the Guardian agents? The regulatory picture doesn't help. NIST issued a Request for Information in January specifically on securing AI agent systems — the federal standards body is asking industry how to manage agentic AI risk because the frameworks don't exist yet. The EU AI Act compliance deadline for high-risk AI systems just moved to December 2027. AI Control Tower doesn't hit general availability until August 2026. The enforcement layer is already being sold. The rulebook is still being written. Happy to dig into the primary sources if anyone wants specifics. submitted by /u/roll0ver [link] [留言]

Apparently, talking or mentioning conspiracy theories is enough for Anthropic to ban you from using Claude. submitted by /u/Bitter-Heart7039 [link] [留言]

Is this significant news? submitted by /u/sstiel [link] [留言]

Back in the 1980s a debate raged about whether it was okay to let children use calculators in elementary school. Critics warned that giving kids calculators would lead to the "destruction of student math skills." A similar debate is happening today across a range of areas, including coding, writing and even music. Will using AI lead a brain drain across these and many other areas? One of my favorite authors is Isaac Asimov. He's better known for his Foundation and Robot series of books where he contemplates whether an algorithm can successfully predict (and guide) humankind's development and the relationship between super artificial intelligence and humans. In some ways he predicted what we're experiencing today with AI: the rise of powerful, inscrutable artificial machines that are so complex humans can't understand or maintain them. In the short story, "The Last Question" he wrote: "Multivac was self-adjusting and self-correcting. It had to be, for nothing human could adjust and correct it quickly enough or even adequately enough." We're living an age that was once the stuff of science fiction. The question is: what comes next? submitted by /u/SpiritRealistic8174 [link] [留言]

submitted by /u/SpeedAssassin [link] [留言]

been building AI agents for a while and noticing a pattern: the LLM reasoning part works. the part that breaks is everything around accounts, logins, and verification. agent gets to "sign up for this service" and then: - email verification loop breaks - OTP times out while the agent is mid-step - captcha or bot detection fires - session expires between steps the model figured out what to do. the infrastructure around it didn't cooperate. curious if this matches what others are building. where do your agents actually fail in production? is it the reasoning, or is it the plumbing? submitted by /u/kumard3 [link] [留言]

submitted by /u/ProfessorDeep8754 [link] [留言]

Disclosure: I work on the benchmark below, so flagging that up front. We've been testing whether LLMs can critique recent science-paper summaries — catch planted flaws, overclaims, and missing evidence — and, separately, how calibrated they are about their own judgments (confidence scored with Brier, a strictly proper rule). The pattern that keeps showing up: the models best at spotting problems are also among the most confidently wrong when they miss. Critique skill and calibration look like different axes, not the same one. There's also a clear gap between raw accuracy and knowing when to abstain. It's open (Apache-2.0) if you want to poke at it: Leaderboard: https://huggingface.co/spaces/BGPT-OFFICIAL/refute-leaderboard Dataset: https://huggingface.co/datasets/BGPT-OFFICIAL/refute Curious how others think about measuring calibration vs. raw capability — is a proper scoring rule enough, or do you need explicit abstention metrics too? submitted by /u/connerpro [link] [留言]

After spending the last few weeks reading through the reasoning literature, I noticed a trend that seems worth discussing. For the past 2–3 years, a large fraction of progress in LLM reasoning came from making models generate more intermediate thoughts. Chain-of-Thought prompting (Wei et al., 2022) pushed PaLM 540B from roughly 18% to 58% on GSM8K. Self-Consistency added another 17.9 percentage points by exploring multiple reasoning paths before committing to an answer. Tree-of-Thoughts later showed that GPT-4's success rate on Game of 24 could jump from 4% to 74% when reasoning was reformulated as search rather than a single chain. DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI's o1 pushed the idea even further by allocating substantial test-time compute to reasoning itself. Taken together, these results seemed to point in the same direction: giving models additional reasoning trajectories, search paths, or thinking steps often improved outcomes. Recent work increasingly asks whether those traces are actually necessary. Quiet-STaR doesnt treat reasoning traces primarily as explanations for humans. Instead, it trains models to generate internal rationales that improve future token prediction. COCONUT goes a step further and asks a more radical question: why force reasoning to be represented as language at all? Rather than generating reasoning tokens, it feeds continuous hidden states back into the model and performs reasoning directly in latent space. Fast Quiet-STaR then shows that some of the benefits of explicit reasoning can be retained even after removing thought-token generation during inference. This feels like a meaningful shift in research direction. For a while, the field seemed focused on making reasoning more visible. Recent work increasingly explores whether visibility is actually necessary. One way to interpret this is that Chain-of-Thought was never the reasoning process itself. It was a computational scaffold. Transformers perform a fixed amount of computation per generated

As the conflict in Iran disrupts the world’s oil supply, airlines are looking for jet fuel alternatives. The answer: energy from used cooking oil and french fry grease.

PM at a mid-size startup here. Didn’t really notice how bad it got until this week. My workflow now: • Claude for ideation • ChatGPT for rewriting specs • Cursor for implementation • Perplexity for research • Notion AI for docs • Atoms AI for larger tasks None of these tools actually replaced my work. They just redistributed it. I’m still the one dragging context between all of them.Yesterday I literally caught myself pasting the exact same requirement into 4 different tools and thinking… this can’t be how it’s supposed to work. I don’t even think any single tool is bad. It just feels like we hired 6 smart interns and completely forgot to get a manager. submitted by /u/Dangerous-Guava-9232 [link] [留言]

I build and teach this, so here's the honest mechanics, not the hype. Build one consistent AI character (custom-trained, not just prompting), run it as a social presence, monetize on platforms that allow AI. The edge isn't quality vs humans — it's near-zero content cost, no burnout, horizontal scaling. The underrated hard part: consistency is genuinely difficult, and the money is in audience relationship management, not the content. The content's the easy 20%. Broader signal: when content cost hits zero, the bottleneck becomes distribution and trust. Applies way past this niche. Happy to go deeper on any part — it's what I do daily. submitted by /u/PoleTV [link] [留言]

The Air succeeds as a minimalist, reliable fitness tracker, but Google's AI Health Coach feels unnecessary.

I work on a podcast and we wanna do an episode where we have a proponent and opponent of data centers talk. We're looking for a good oppponent voice. Any names or organizations that are intelligent and well spoken and worth checking out? submitted by /u/BikeLaneHero [link] [留言]