标签：#keys

Why passkey apps treat Windows differently than other operating systems.

What the report found The FIDO Alliance — the industry group behind the passwordless authentication standard — released its State of Passkeys 2026 report in May, based on research across 11,000 consumers and 1,400 enterprise decision-makers in ten countries. A few numbers stand out: passkeys now see a 93% sign-in success rate compared to 63% for passwords, and average sign-in time drops to roughly 8.5 seconds versus over 30 seconds for password-based logins. Awareness has also jumped to 90% of consumers, with about 5 billion passkeys now active worldwide. The security case is the more important one. Passkeys are built to be phishing-resistant by design — unlike a password, there’s no shared secret that can be typed into a fake login page, because the credential is cryptographically tied to the real site and your device. That’s a structural fix, not a behavioral one — it doesn’t depend on you spotting a scam email, which is precisely where most password-based breaches start. Why adoption still lags Here’s the more interesting number: even among organizations that have rolled out passkeys, the majority still keep passwords running in parallel as a fallback, and a large share of individual users still don’t use passkeys everywhere they’re offered. The barrier at this point isn’t awareness — it’s habit. People default to what’s familiar, even when the safer option is one tap away. The practical takeaway Most major platforms — Google, Apple, Microsoft, and a growing list of banks and retailers — now offer passkeys as a login option, usually sitting quietly in account security settings labeled “passkey” or “sign in without a password.” The action worth taking today: pick your two or three most important accounts (email first, since it’s the recovery path to everything else) and set up a passkey where it’s offered, instead of waiting for a breach to force the decision. Passkeys aren’t foolproof — device loss and account-recovery flows are still an active area of security r

Interesting research on a new class of weak RSA keys: keys with lots of zeros. It turns out that these keys are out in the wild. The badkeys project is an open-source service that checks public keys for known vulnerabilities. While developing this tool, Hanno collected a massive number of real-world keys from public sources, including Certificate Transparency logs, internet-wide TLS and SSH scans, PGP keys, and many others. By searching this dataset for unexpectedly sparse RSA moduli, we uncovered a large number of keys in the wild with the patterns in Figure 1...

Someone on your leadership team asked a reasonable question: should we adopt passkeys? You searched for answers and found implementation tutorials - WebAuthn server libraries, credential storage schemas, ceremony diagrams. They assume you've already decided. None of that helps you answer the question you were actually asked. This article is a decision guide. The question isn't how to implement passkey login. It's whether you should, when the timing makes sense, and for which users first. Implementation details matter eventually - but they don't belong at the front of the decision. You've seen Apple's demos and Google's Chrome nudges. Your security team may have sent a memo about phishing-resistant authentication. You know the term. What you don't have is a clear way to evaluate whether passkeys fit your product, your users, and your team's capacity to ship and support them. By the end of this article, you'll have scored your app against a readiness checklist, mapped show-stoppers that can block adoption, and drafted a one-page recommendation for leadership. Plain Terms: Passkeys, Passwords, and MFA Before scoring your app, you and stakeholders need to mean the same thing when you say "passkey", "password", and "MFA". Vendor decks use these loosely. A PM might say "passkeys replace passwords" while security means "phishing-resistant credentials". Both can be true. Passwords are shared secrets the user types; your server checks a hash. They leak via breaches and phishing sites. Users forget them, reuse them, and call support. MFA adds a second factor - app push, SMS, hardware key, or biometric. It cuts credential-stuffing and many phishing attacks, but adds friction, lost-device tickets, and cross-platform complexity. Passkeys are cryptographic key pairs on the user's device. The private key never leaves the device or synced passkey manager. Sign-in means unlocking with biometrics or a PIN; your server stores only the public key and verifies a signature. On web, the b

This is interesting: The U.S. military has likely been quietly broadcasting codes for its global encryption network using public GPS for nearly 20 years, turning each satellite into a hidden “numbers station,” according to Steven Murdoch… That means every device that uses GPS has been receiving hidden government information for years, and nobody outside the military knew it until now. […] Murdoch discovered that this particular sentinel was transmitted by all 31 operational satellites within a window of a few hours on May 26, 2011, potentially heralding the activation of a new operational system. He confirmed that this timeline coincided with the rollout of the military’s Over-the-Air Distribution (OTAD) and the Over-the-Air Rekeying (OTAR) by cross-referencing declassified documents, including a 2015 presentation about the dates of the operation...

Crazy story : Until this past weekend, a contractor for the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintained a public GitHub repository that exposed credentials to several highly privileged AWS GovCloud accounts and a large number of internal CISA systems. Security experts said the public archive included files detailing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software internally, and that it represents one of the most egregious government data leaks in recent history. News article .