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The glasses are targeted at people who might be constantly in meetings, giving presentations, and traveling to countries where different languages are spoken.

Hey HN! I made Orbit, an iOS app that allows you to see the satellites, planets, and constellations above you in AR, on a 2D map, and on a 3D globe. The app includes more than 15,000 objects tracked by CelesTrack, together with their pass predictions, descriptions, and detailed orbital data. A searchable catalog of all objects is also available, as well as a built-in chatbot designed to answer any space-related questions you might have. This is my first published iOS app, so any feedback is grea

Developers flagged a freshly filed, reproducible issue that should make anyone running background agents pause: Claude Code's background Opus subagents intermittently stall on their first turn and, instead of producing useful work, emit system-prompt fragments — including text shaped like authorization data — as their only output. It's labeled a security issue, it has a reproduction, and it's open. That's enough to treat it as a real, if intermittent, class of failure. Here's the mental model that matters: a subagent is not a trusted subprocess. It's an autonomous loop with access to a context window, a toolset, and — too often — the same credentials as its parent. When that loop stalls and dumps its prompt instead of its result, anything that was in context is now in output. Authorization-shaped text leaking is the canary: if the prompt carried a token, a session string, or an internal endpoint, that's what surfaces. The fix is structural, not reactive. Three rules: 1. Scope credentials per subagent, not per session. A background agent that only needs to read a repo shouldn't hold deploy keys. Hand it the narrowest token that completes its task and revoke it when the task ends. If the tooling can't scope credentials, that's a gap to close before you scale subagents. 2. Treat subagent output as untrusted. Anything a subagent returns — including error text, logs, and especially "stalled" dumps — should be parsed and sanitized before it touches shared state. Don't pipe raw subagent output into a context that feeds other agents or into any log that leaves your machine. 3. Separate the system prompt from the working context. The leak happened because authorization-shaped content sat in the same window the subagent could echo. Keep credentials and internal routing data out of the prompt that a stalled loop might surface. Put them in a side channel the model can call, not text it can print. The deeper lesson is about failure modes, not one bug. Most agent setups assume th

The feed showed a new entrant worth watching: Tencent has launched Hy3, a coding-focused AI model, with input tokens priced at $0.14 per million. For developers who live in the terminal running coding agents, that price point lands well below the per-token rates most frontier models charge, and it puts a major lab's coding model into the "cheap enough to leave running" category. What makes this interesting isn't just the number — it's the positioning. Hy3 is being pitched specifically as a coding AI, not a general chatbot, which suggests vendors are starting to carve out developer-facing models with their own pricing tiers rather than forcing coders to pay general-purpose rates. Developers spotted the launch in the daily AI news roundup and immediately started comparing it against the cost of running their existing agents. The catch, as always, is what the headline price doesn't tell you: output token cost, context-window limits, and how the model actually performs on real repository tasks all remain open questions. A low input price is meaningless if output is expensive or if the model needs five retries to get a diff right. Still, a credible cheap coding model from a major player is exactly the kind of pressure that nudges the whole category toward per-token transparency. If nothing else, it gives every other vendor a new number to justify theirs against.

Welcome to Learning Xahau, a series of articles dedicated to helping developers, builders, and blockchain enthusiasts better understand the Xahau ecosystem. Whether you're just getting started or already building advanced applications, these posts will explore Xahau's features, architecture, and best practices through practical examples and real-world use cases. If you've been building with Hooks on Xahau, you know the basic loop: write a C program, compile it to WebAssembly, install it on an account, and it fires automatically when that account is involved in a transaction. Simple and powerful, but until the 2026.6.21 major release, there were some friction points that made real-world hook architectures more complicated than they needed to be. This release ships three improvements that directly address those friction points: HookOnV2 : split the single HookOn bitmask into separate HookOnIncoming and HookOnOutgoing controls NamedHooks : assign a human-readable name to each hook slot, so senders can choose which hook to activate Simulate RPC : preview a transaction including all hook executions without spending fees or changing ledger state None of these require rewriting your hook logic. They are configuration and tooling improvements at the SetHook and transaction level. But they fundamentally change what you can build cleanly. All code in this article targets the Xahau Testnet ( wss://xahau-test.net ) and requires xahau.js 4.1.1 or later. Clone the companion repository: git clone https://github.com/Ekiserrepe/learningxahau20260621.git cd learningxahau20260621 npm install Copy .env.example to .env and fill in the seeds used across these examples: cp .env.example .env HUB_SEED = # account that installs the directional hook (07, 08, 09) NAMED_HUB_SEED= # account that installs and owns the named hooks (10, 11, 13, 14) SENDER_SEED = # account that sends payments targeting a named hook (12, 14) All accounts need testnet funds from the Xahau Testnet Faucet . HookOnV2: Di