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AI 资讯

Building a local video search CLI with ffmpeg and OpenCLIP

I often remember the shot I want before I remember its filename. That gap is what binquery is for. It is a local Python CLI that indexes video clips and turns a sentence into a ranked shortlist for a human to review. It deliberately stops before editing: no timeline generation, no automatic cut, and no render. The smallest reproducible trial You can test the complete installed command path without supplying footage: python3 -m venv .venv .venv/bin/pip install binquery .venv/bin/binquery demo --out /tmp/binquery-demo The demo generates a synthetic 30-second video locally, then exercises splitting, indexing, validation, and querying. The first run may download OpenCLIP model weights. This is an end-to-end pipeline smoke test, not evidence of semantic search quality on real footage. Why keep the architecture small? The current design uses: ffmpeg to sample three frames from each clip OpenCLIP ViT-B-32 to build the local visual index plain JSON and NumPy files for metadata and vectors a JSON result containing clip paths, scores, and ranking signals There is no database, vector service, or daemon to operate. Querying an existing index does not resample the footage or rebuild the full index. The trade-off is straightforward: three frames keep indexing understandable and bounded, but they can miss important content in long or visually varied clips. I would rather expose that limitation than market a synthetic demo as a quality benchmark. Ranking signals are not explanations The output includes fields such as score , gate , and reasons . Here, reasons means ranking signals recorded by the pipeline. It should not be interpreted as a reliable semantic explanation of why a clip is correct. That distinction matters because a plausible-looking explanation can create more confidence than the underlying retrieval quality deserves. The shortlist is meant to reduce what a person must inspect, not replace editorial judgment. What binquery does not do It does not build a timeline or e

2026-08-25 原文 →
AI 资讯

Why every BaZi calculator disagrees with the almanac

Every Four Pillars calculator — saju in Korea, BaZi in China — agrees on the easy 95% of the job. Feed it a birth date and it maps that instant onto a traditional calendar: four pillars, each a heavenly stem paired with an earthly branch. The remaining 5% is boundaries. And at the boundaries, nearly all of them quietly disagree with the printed almanac they claim to reproduce. I maintain a saju reading service, and getting these four cases right was most of the actual engineering. Here they are, with the failing inputs. 1. A solar term is an instant, not a date The year pillar does not turn on January 1, and not on lunar new year either. It turns at 입춘 (ipchun, "start of spring") — one of the 24 solar terms, defined by the sun's apparent longitude. In 2024 that moment was February 4, 16:27 KST . A calculator that applies solar terms at day granularity says "February 4 → new year pillar" and hands the wrong year to everyone born that morning. npx k-saju 2024-02-04 04:00 # year 癸卯 — still the old year pillar, because 04:00 < 16:27 The fix is unglamorous: store term boundaries as instants and compare instants. The subtlety is that this correction applies to the year and month pillars only — the day pillar runs on its own sexagenary count and must not be touched. 2. The 23:00 hour belongs to two days at once Traditional practice starts the day at 23:00, not midnight — the hour of the Rat (자시). So for a birth at 23:31, there are two defensible answers about which day's stem the hour pillar derives from, and schools split on it. The convention this engine declares: the day pillar keeps clock midnight , while the hour stem takes the next day's stem (the 야자시 rule). npx k-saju 2000-05-15 23:31 # day 癸酉, hour 甲子 I am not claiming this is the One True Rule. I am claiming it should be written down. Most tools pick a side in silence, which is how two calculators give one person two charts and neither can explain why. 3. The clock is not the sun Korea keeps time on the 135°E meri

2026-08-25 原文 →
AI 资讯

Baklava: Generate API Documentation and Type-Safe Clients from Scala Routing Tests

API documentation has a reliability problem. The code gets updated; the OpenAPI spec gets forgotten. The spec gets updated; the TypeScript client doesn't regenerate. By the time an enterprise client asks for your API contract, the document you hand them describes a system that no longer exists. Baklava, an open-source library by Iterators , solves this structurally: documentation is generated from the tests that verify your actual API behaviour, so it cannot drift. The problem Documentation drift is the default state of any API that lives long enough. The causes are well-understood: docs and code are maintained separately, documentation updates require extra discipline at every PR, and no automated check catches a route signature change that wasn't reflected in the OpenAPI file. The consequence is real. Clients building against a stale spec hit integration errors in production. Internal teams onboarding to a service spend hours reconciling the documented contract with actual behaviour. TypeScript front-ends break when an API response field changes without a corresponding client update. The problem compounds as the API grows. The solution Baklava integrates into your existing test suite. When routing tests run, baklava observes each request and response, infers the API surface, and generates documentation as a test output, not as a separate build step, not as a manually-maintained file. In baklava, the test is the documentation spec. Instead of a standard assertion block, each route is defined with path() , supports() , and onRequest() scenarios that both verify the API behaviour and describe it for documentation output: ​`// The test IS the documentation spec class UserApiSpec extends AnyFunSpec with BaklavaPekkoHttp[Unit, Unit, ScalatestAsExecution] with BaklavaScalatest[Route, ToEntityMarshaller, FromEntityUnmarshaller] { path("/users/{userId}")( supports( GET, pathParameters = p Long , summary = "Get user by ID" )( onRequest(pathParameters = 1L) .respondsWith Use

2026-08-25 原文 →
AI 资讯

I open-sourced a UI kit — then went looking for everything I got wrong about it

There's no shortage of React UI kits on npm. Search for one right now, and you'll get hundreds of results, most with the same seven button variants and a Storybook someone abandoned halfway through. So when I open-sourced brightframe — pulled out of a real coworking site I built, LAN — I didn't really want to write the usual "here's our 70 components, look how many there are" post. Component count isn't interesting. Anyone can list props and screenshot a button in five colors. What actually took time, and what I think is worth writing about, is the part that happens after the README makes a claim. "Tree-shakeable." "Server Components-safe." "Accessible." Those are three words I typed pretty confidently early on, and then, more recently, I sat down and tried to prove myself wrong on each one. This post is what that turned up. "Tree-shakeable per component" — okay, but how much, actually? Every component ships as its own entry point: import " brightframe/tokens.css " ; import " brightframe/Btn.css " ; import { Btn } from " brightframe/Btn " ; Saying "unused components add nothing to your bundle" costs nothing. I added size-limit to CI so the claim has to keep being true, not just have been true once when I wrote the sentence: Entry Minified + brotli Whole kit ( import { ... } from "brightframe" , JS) 40.13 kB Whole kit ( brightframe/style.css ) 11.83 kB One component ( brightframe/Btn , JS) 641 B One component's styles ( brightframe/Btn.css ) 890 B 641 bytes vs. 40 kilobytes. That gap is the whole reason the per-component entry points exist, and now if a refactor accidentally makes Btn drag in half the kit, the build just fails instead of me finding out from a bundle-size complaint six months later. "Server Components-safe" — this one had an actual bug in it RSC has no hook dispatcher at all. A component needs "use client" if it does one of two things in its own source: calls a hook, or wires up a DOM event handler in its own JSX. I wrote a little script ( scripts/che

2026-08-25 原文 →
AI 资讯

How I Built a Zero-Trust Docker Sandbox for AI Coding Agents & Untrusted Repos

My vision a lightweight, permission-headache-free Docker setup for running OpenCode, uv, and untrusted Python code without risking your host OS. When contributing to unfamiliar open-source projects or letting AI coding agents (like OpenCode ) run terminal commands, there's always a slight hesitation. What if a build script touches my system Python, or a rogue command wipes host files? To solve this, I built saferun a zero-trust, disposable Docker sandbox designed specifically for Python developers and AI agent workflows on macOS and Linux. Here’s how it works, the permission nightmares I had to solve, and how you can set it up in under two minutes. The Goal I wanted a workspace that gave me: Absolute Isolation: Runtime scripts, pytest , ruff , and AI agent commands execute strictly inside a disposable Linux container. Seamless IDE Integration: Files edited inside PyCharm or VS Code on the host machine sync instantly with the container. Zero Permission Headaches: Any files generated inside the sandbox belong to my host user account—not root . Persistent Speed: Package downloads cached permanently via uv so environment startup stays millisecond-fast. Isolated Credentials: Global SSH and Git keys remain safely on the host machine. Solving the "Non-Root" Docker Nightmare The hardest part of containerized dev environments is file ownership. If you run Docker as root , any file your AI agent generates belongs to root , locking you out on your host machine. If you pass your local user ID ( -u "$(id -u):$(id -g)" ), Docker mounts non-existent directories as root:root , causing Permission Denied crashes when tools like uv try to write to cache folders. saferun solves this inside the base Dockerfile by pre-creating cache directories and granting open write permissions upfront: FROM python:3.12-slim # Install curl (needed to install OpenCode) RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ curl \ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/ * # Install uv globally RUN pip

2026-08-25 原文 →
AI 资讯

Your Form Is Not Portable If It Contains Callbacks

What makes a form portable? Not JSON alone. Its validation, conditions, collections and submission semantics must survive the trip too. I wrote about the architecture behind Modyra and the trade-offs involved. Your Form Is Not Portable If It Contains Callbacks Most form libraries help us manage forms inside an application. They track values, execute validators, expose errors and eventually produce a submission payload. That works well until the form needs to exist somewhere else. Perhaps its structure comes from a backend. Perhaps a visual builder generates it. Perhaps multiple applications must render it. Perhaps the server must independently validate the same conditional rules used by the browser. At that point, the form is no longer just component state. It is a contract. And most form abstractions cannot cross that boundary. The portability illusion Consider a typical conditional validator: const form = createForm ({ defaultValues : { country : ' IT ' , vatId : '' , }, validators : { onChange : ({ value }) => { if ( value . country === ' IT ' && ! value . vatId ) { return { fields : { vatId : ' VAT ID is required in Italy ' , }, }; } }, }, }); This is perfectly reasonable application code. It is also not portable. The callback cannot travel through an API as JSON. A Java service cannot execute it. A visual editor cannot reliably inspect it. Another runtime cannot reproduce its meaning without receiving executable source code. We can serialize the values around the callback, but not the behavior itself. This leads to an important distinction: A form configuration is not a portable form contract if part of its meaning still lives inside executable callbacks. The obvious shortcuts are dangerous There are several tempting ways to work around this limitation. Serialize the callback as source code { "condition" : "value.country === 'IT'" } The receiving application must now parse or execute an expression encoded as text. That creates immediate problems: the expression

2026-08-24 原文 →
开源项目

🔥 AgriciDaniel / claude-obsidian - Self-organizing AI second brain for Obsidian + Claude Code.

GitHub热门项目 | Self-organizing AI second brain for Obsidian + Claude Code. Drop any source and Claude reads, links, and files it into one connected knowledge graph of plain Markdown you own. AI note-taking, personal knowledge management (PKM), and an open-source Notion alternative. Based on Karpathy's LLM Wiki pattern. | Stars: 11,516 | 272 stars today | 语言: Python

2026-08-24 原文 →
AI 资讯

A Signed AI Agent Receipt Can Still Be Wrong

Your AI agent returns a signed receipt: 0 defects found. The signature is valid. The receipt has not been altered. The agent was authorized to run the check. The result can still be wrong. Perhaps the scanner hit a rate limit and silently converted eleven failures into eleven empty results. Perhaps a watchdog inspected 8 machines and issued a conclusion about 68. Perhaps a database health check ran select 1 successfully while the application was failing because a required column did not exist. In every case, the software can produce a well-formed result. It can even sign that result correctly. What it cannot prove is that it measured the claim the business thinks it measured. That distinction is becoming one of the most important problems in agent infrastructure: authentic receipt != adequate measurement authorized action != correct conclusion zero findings != complete inspection A signature answers only part of the question Cryptographic signatures are valuable. They can prove who signed an object and whether its contents changed after signing. They do not prove: that the check actually ran that it reached the intended target that it measured the right population that the sample supports the claimed conclusion that exceptions were not converted into zeros that a passing control answered the business question This is the difference between provenance integrity and measurement integrity . Provenance integrity asks: Who made this statement, and was the statement altered? Measurement integrity asks: What was actually observed, how much of the target was covered, and is the conclusion justified by that observation? An agent work protocol needs both. Otherwise, a signature can turn uncertainty into durable false confidence. Three failures with the same shape This article grew out of a thoughtful comment from Heinrich Neb on the first article in this series. He described three incidents from one week. First, a harvesting tool scanned 16 public repositories. Five returned

2026-08-24 原文 →
AI 资讯

I ran OpenClaw and Hermes Agent side by side for two weeks — here's what I learned

So I spent the last two weeks running two open-source AI agents in parallel: OpenClaw and Hermes Agent (from Nous Research). I went in expecting to pick a winner. I came out realizing it's not really a "pick one" situation at all. These two projects represent two very different design philosophies — one is built around connection and control , the other around learning and growth . Which one fits you depends on whether you want an obedient tool or a companion that evolves with you. Here's my full breakdown after using both for deployment, daily tasks, and the general "living with it" experience. Two philosophies, two products OpenClaw takes a gateway-first approach. It's a persistent controller that handles routing, permissions, multi-channel integration, and skill orchestration, with pluggable models. The core promise: connect everything, execute predictably. Hermes Agent is built around a learning loop. The agent creates and refines its own skills as you use it, and keeps deepening its model of you over time. The core promise: the more you use it, the better it knows you. A rough analogy: OpenClaw is like a senior assistant who strictly follows the instruction manual — plus a universal adapter. Hermes is more like a teammate who writes their own manual after every task and keeps improving it. The four things that actually differentiate them 1. Skills: ready-made ecosystem vs. self-compounding OpenClaw: human-written skills distributed via ClawHub. Huge ecosystem, works out of the box. Hermes: the agent generates and iterates on skills by itself. Less rich in the short term, but it compounds over time. 2. Memory: good enough vs. actually remembers OpenClaw's default memory is fine (files and Markdown supported). But Hermes' four-layer memory architecture is noticeably more persistent — the difference becomes very tangible after a couple of weeks of use. 3. Autonomy: decisive vs. controllable Hermes is extremely strong when the task is clear — it often nails things

2026-08-24 原文 →
AI 资讯

sentinel-scan-cli vs Cisco mcp-scanner vs Snyk Agent Scan: comparing open-source MCP security scanners

If you're wiring MCP servers into an agent and want to check them for prompt injection, tool poisoning, or supply-chain risk before you trust them, there are now a handful of open-source options. This is a factual, no-benchmarks comparison of the three I could actually find and read the docs for: our own sentinel-scan-cli , Cisco's mcp-scanner , and what used to be Invariant Labs' mcp-scan . One thing worth flagging up front: Invariant Labs' mcp-scan repo ( github.com/invariantlabs-ai/mcp-scan ) now redirects to github.com/snyk/agent-scan . The project has been absorbed into Snyk and rebranded as "Agent Scan" (package snyk-agent-scan ). If you're comparing tools based on older blog posts that reference "Invariant Labs mcp-scan" as a standalone, no-account CLI, that's out of date — running it now requires a free Snyk account and an SNYK_TOKEN API key ( export SNYK_TOKEN=... ) before the CLI will scan anything. I'm comparing against the current Snyk Agent Scan README since that's what the repo actually ships today. All claims below are pulled directly from each project's public README as of 2026-08-24. No invented features, no synthetic benchmarks — this is a "what does the doc actually say" comparison, not a lab test. Feature comparison sentinel-scan-cli Cisco mcp-scanner Snyk Agent Scan (fka Invariant Labs mcp-scan) License MIT Apache 2.0 source-available on GitHub; requires Snyk account/token to run Install zero dependencies, single Python file or pip install / npx github:... uv tool install , Python 3.11+ uvx snyk-agent-scan or standalone binary Signup / API key required to run at all No ( --demo needs nothing; scanning your own endpoint needs only your own endpoint's key) No (core YARA/static scanning works with zero keys; LLM/Cisco AI Defense/VirusTotal analyzers are opt-in extras) Yes — Snyk account + SNYK_TOKEN required before any scan runs What it scans Live LLM endpoint (prompt-injection/jailbreak suite) and static MCP tool manifests ( mcp.json ) Live MCP se

2026-08-24 原文 →