标签：#security

Demystifying WebP to PNG: How to Secure Serverless Edge Routing Configurations Safely We have all been there. You are building a high-performance, modern web application and you decide to store all user-generated assets in modern, ultra-compressed WebP formats. It is a smart move for your Google Lighthouse scores. Then, the legacy enterprise integration request hits your inbox. A major client needs to pull these same assets dynamically, but their internal 15-year-old reporting engine only supports PNG. Suddenly, you need to configure a runtime conversion pipeline that handles complex input schemas, transforms formats on the fly, and manages edge routes without exposing your internal database claims or API secrets. Setting up secure serverless edge routing configurations to convert images on-demand can quickly turn into a security nightmare. If you do not handle incoming credential tokens correctly, you risk forwarding sensitive OAuth scopes or database keys directly to downstream image-processing worker nodes. In this guide, we will break down exactly how to architect a lightweight, secure, and fast edge routing pipeline that validates incoming image request schemas and converts WebP to PNG without leaking sensitive backend credentials. The Problem Modern edge runtimes like Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge Functions, or AWS CloudFront Functions are incredibly fast, but they have strict execution limits. They run on V8 isolates, meaning you do not have a full Node.js environment with unlimited memory and access to heavy C++ binaries like sharp or canvas without paying a massive cold-start penalty. If you want to support legacy clients by converting WebP to PNG on the fly, you are faced with three major challenges: Bundle Size Restrictions : Edge functions typically restrict your code size to 1MB or 2MB. Bundling heavy native libraries to parse image bytes is a recipe for deployment failures. Credential Leakage : Edge routers often intercept incoming JWT authorization

That "authenticity of host can't be established" message isn't just noise. Here's what's actually happening — and why blindly typing "yes" is a security mistake. Every developer has seen this: The authenticity of host 'example.com (203.0.113.1)' can't be established. ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:abc123xyz... Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? Almost everyone types yes without reading it. Then they move on. This message is SSH trying to protect you from one of the most dangerous attacks in network security: the man-in-the-middle attack. Understanding what's happening here — and what the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file actually does — will change how you think about every SSH connection you make. The Problem SSH Is Solving When you connect to ssh user@example.com , how do you know you're actually talking to example.com ? You can't rely on the IP address — IP addresses can be spoofed or rerouted. You can't rely on DNS — DNS can be poisoned. You can't rely on the network path — traffic can be intercepted at any point between you and the server. Without verification, an attacker positioned between you and the server could intercept the connection, pose as the server, decrypt everything you send, re-encrypt it, and forward it along. You'd type your password or authenticate with your key and never know the attacker saw every keystroke. This is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack . It's not theoretical. It happens on compromised networks, corporate proxies, malicious Wi-Fi hotspots, and misconfigured infrastructure. SSH's defense is host key verification . Every SSH server has a unique cryptographic identity — its host key. Before you exchange any sensitive data, the server proves it holds the private key corresponding to a public key you've previously verified. If the keys don't match, SSH warns you — loudly. What a Host Key Actually Is When OpenSSH is installed on a server, it automatically generates a set of host key pairs. These live in /etc

⚠️ For defensive/educational purposes only. Sniff only networks you own or are explicitly authorized to test. Unauthorized network monitoring is illegal in most jurisdictions. The uncomfortable truth about your factory floor If your plant uses Modbus TCP — and statistically, it probably does — every register read, every coil write, every sensor value is flying across your network in plaintext . No encryption. No authentication. No signature. Nothing. Modbus was designed in 1979 by Modicon for serial communication between a PLC and a few field devices on a dedicated cable. The threat model was "someone might physically tap the wire." The solution was "don't let strangers into the control room." Forty-five years later, that same protocol is running over your corporate VLAN, talking to cloud historians, and occasionally — if your IT/OT segmentation has gaps — reachable from the internet. Let me show you what that looks like from the wire. The 5-line sniffer This is a defensive monitoring tool. Same code your blue team would use to baseline normal traffic and detect anomalies. Requires scapy : pip install scapy from scapy.all import sniff , TCP , Raw def show_modbus ( pkt ): if TCP in pkt and pkt [ TCP ]. dport == 502 and Raw in pkt : payload = pkt [ Raw ]. load print ( f " { pkt [ ' IP ' ]. src } → { pkt [ ' IP ' ]. dst } : { payload . hex () } " ) sniff ( filter = " tcp port 502 " , prn = show_modbus , store = False ) Run it on a span port, a TAP, or a mirror VLAN, and within seconds you'll see something like this: 192.168.1.50 → 192.168.1.10: 0001000000060103006400 02 192.168.1.10 → 192.168.1.50: 00010000000701030441f00000 192.168.1.50 → 192.168.1.10: 00020000000601100065000102 Every byte tells a story. Let's decode the first packet. Decoding what you just captured The Modbus TCP frame format is documented in the spec (it's public — that's part of the problem): Bytes 0-1: Transaction ID Bytes 2-3: Protocol ID (always 0x0000 for Modbus) Bytes 4-5: Length Byte 6: Unit

When regulation becomes theater and encryption becomes window dressing By Vektor Memory — 20 min read It is raining here in the Southern Hemisphere again. It has been raining for three weeks now, nonstop. I’m sitting with my chai coffee, watching out of the window, and thinking about data sovereignty. It is, genuinely, the kind of thing I think about often. The northern hemisphere is winding up for summer. Europe is getting ready for long evenings and beach holidays. I’m quietly jealous. I’ve always wanted to split the year: six months south, six months north. Endless summer. The perpetual warmth of a life lived chasing the sun. But here I am. Chai. Rain. Data. I’ve been turning over one question in particular: why is it that the moment you mention data sovereignty, people immediately reach for GDPR? It’s reflexive, especially among Europeans. Understandable. GDPR is loud, it’s enforced, it has teeth. French, German, and Dutch visitors make up a large disproportionate share of our site traffic at VEKTOR, and the interest in privacy and sovereignty from that audience is intense and genuine. Northern Europeans, by and large, take this seriously in a way that other markets don’t; they are working on ways to disassociate from the cloud around the world. And yet. How many times have we clicked “Accept All” on a cookie banner in the last week? How many times have you scrolled past a privacy policy that runs to forty-two pages? How many times have you handed over your email address, your location, your device fingerprint, your behavioral patterns not because you wanted to, but because there was no meaningful alternative? GDPR created the most sophisticated legal architecture for data rights the world has ever seen. It also created the most sophisticated ritual of consent theater the world has ever performed. That gap, between the law and the lived reality, is what this article is about. Ubiquitous data centre growth image The Reflex Problem When people think of data sovere

The third-party website exposed passports, selfies, and the location data of applicants who submitted their documents as part of the U.K. visa application process. Instead of fixing the issue, the website sent attorneys.

Cybercriminals used the Glassworm botnet to infect open source software projects with malware, and in turn hack the developers and companies that use that software.

InfoQ expands its online certification portfolio with new AI Engineering and Organizational Architecture cohorts, giving senior practitioners a confidential peer group to pressure-test production AI, platform, team design, and architecture decisions. By Artenisa Chatziou

Local AI agents are having a moment right now. Developers are increasingly uncomfortable with...

The Trust Identity Protocol is a free, open, post-quantum, patented standard for verified human identity and AI content provenance on the public internet. Built by The AI Lab Intelligence Unobscured, Inc.

IAM, DLP, and API gateways are necessary parts of an organization's security stack. None of them...

Crazy story : Until this past weekend, a contractor for the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintained a public GitHub repository that exposed credentials to several highly privileged AWS GovCloud accounts and a large number of internal CISA systems. Security experts said the public archive included files detailing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software internally, and that it represents one of the most egregious government data leaks in recent history. News article .

GitHub Enterprise Server customers need to take immediate action. The post Investigation update: GitHub Enterprise Server signing key rotation appeared first on The GitHub Blog .

Good report : Executive Summary: Let’s say you wanted to make sure that your AI is secure. Can you just maximize the security and privacy benchmark and call it a day? Nope, because benchmarks don’t actually work for measuring AI capabilities (even when they are NOT emergent systemic properties like security). So let’s take a step back: how do you measure security in the first place? Good question. Over the last 30 years, security engineering for software evolved from black box penetration testing, through whitebox code analysis and architectural risk analysis to de facto process-driven standards like the Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM). Software had a very deep impact on business operations, and it appears that AI is going to have an even deeper impact. Will a software security-like measurement move work for AI? Probably. In the meantime we can make real progress in AI security by cleaning up our WHAT piles and managing risk by identifying and applying good assurance processes. (Spoiler alert: no matter what we do, we still don’t get a security meter for AI, so we need to be extra vigilant about security.)...

We're updating our bug bounty program standards to prioritize quality submissions, clarify shared responsibility boundaries, and evolve how we reward low-risk findings. The post Raising the bar: Quality, shared responsibility, and the future of GitHub’s bug bounty program appeared first on The GitHub Blog .

OpenAI details its response to the TanStack “Mini Shai-Hulud” supply chain attack, outlines protections taken to secure systems and signing certificates, and explains why macOS users must update OpenAI apps by June 12, 2026. Learn what happened, what was affected, and how OpenAI is strengthening defenses against evolving software supply chain threats.

They also locked students out of Canvas and warned the company to negotiate with them by May 12.

CISA is warning that Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS is under active attack and needs to be patched ASAP.

Fake travel reservations are exacting more pain from the travel weary, already dealing with the misery of canceled flights and overbooked hotels.

Separate fixes to macOS and iOS patch respective flaws in the kernel and WebKit that can allow threat actors to take over devices and are under attack.

An insufficient validation input flaw, one of 11 patched in an update this week, could allow for arbitrary code execution and is under active attack.