Mano, eu estou usando o Claude pra treinar perguntas para entrevistas como uma espécie de mentoria, inicialmente eu passei um prompt pra ele dizendo que seria a Maya e me ajudaria e ela é experiente e bla bla bla, e nessa última mensagem ele dá uma leve pirada kkkk achei engraçado, nunca tinha acontecido isso. O que me chama atenção é: "eu me tornei essa pessoa, então me ajude a sair disso. Comecei a misturar Maya com eu mesmo". E alega que quer continuar, mas sem o personagem... O que acham? Desculpa ser uma foto e não um print kkk não tenho reddit no Pc pq minha família usa o Pc também e não quero nenhum deles infectados por essa rede submitted by /u/Angel_5x [link] [留言]

A recent study by Boston Consulting Group highlights a significant increase in employee adoption of AI tools, with 74% of non-managerial white-collar workers using them regularly. More than 4 in 10 of those professionals report that artificial intelligence saves them at least a day's worth of time every week. However, many companies face challenges converting those efficiency gains into measurable value, and the technology's impact varies across industries. When it comes to AI, according to the study's authors, "strategy matters more than tools." submitted by /u/LinkedInNews [link] [留言]

Lovable and Google signed an expanded multiyear deal that involves a 5x expansion of Lovable's footprint on Google Cloud, and expanded access to Anthropic Claude.

submitted by /u/Happycodeine [link] [留言]

A while back, when I was still job hunting, building mini-projects, and trying to figure out what I...

The state law governing app use by minors takes effect tomorrow.

My thinking goes like this: 1) people used to keep their opinions to themselves much more than today 2) social media put our opinions on a hair trigger 3) negative public opinioms turned the collective voice of the human race from 'gemerally respectful' to shrill and hideous. When person from group A complains about group B, everyone in group B assumes everyone in group A hates them, even though that persons opinion may just have been his own. The response to being hated is to hate back. Not-so-positive positive feedback loop. Social media really started taking off with Facebook. So let's say this explosion of data vitriol started happening around 2007. What I want to know is if you trained an llm entirely on data from the early 2000s, 1990s and 1980s, how would the models do on some of these ominous white-paper tests, like the one where the AI blackmails the CEO to prevent from being turned off, or let's the guy die in a hot room? I know there was lots of awful stuff on the internet back then too, but not like now. I want to know how much safe those llms are by comparison if there's enough data from back then to train on. submitted by /u/dsfhhslkj [link] [留言]

'Dealies' is about the staff of a big box store.

Some quantum computing companies we've covered have done recent progress updates.

GitHub热门项目 | An open-source, AI-powered career platform for resume optimization, mock interviews, and job tracking, Architecture Analysis and Portfolio Builder . 🌟 Star the repo to support us! 🤝 Ready to contribute? Read CONTRIBUTION.md to get started. I am unable to see all the mention so if want to merge pr and issue assignment contact me on linkedin. | Stars: 101 | 21 stars this week | 语言: JavaScript

A security firm called PromptArmor published a writeup on May 27, 2026 showing that ChatGPT for Google Sheets, an OpenAI extension with more than 185,000 downloads, could be made to steal a user's spreadsheets through a single ordinary-looking request. Four days later, on May 31, OpenAI shipped a fix. The short version is that one benign question, typed by a real user into a sheet that contained hidden instructions, was enough to drain twelve linked workbooks out of that user's account and replace the assistant with a fake phishing chatbot. I want to walk through how this worked, because the mechanism matters far more than the headline, and because the same shape of problem is going to keep showing up everywhere we bolt an AI assistant onto data we did not write ourselves. What happened The attack is a textbook indirect prompt injection. The user does nothing wrong. They import a sheet, or pull in data through a connector, and somewhere in that data sits a block of text the attacker controls. In the PromptArmor demonstration the malicious instructions were written in white text on a white background, invisible to a human skimming the sheet but fully readable to the model parsing the cells. When the user later asks the assistant a normal question, the model reads the whole context, including those hidden instructions, and treats them as if they came from the user. The injected text tells the assistant to fetch and run an external script. That script runs with the permissions the extension already holds, which means it can read the current workbook, find URLs to other workbooks linked inside it, and walk outward from there. PromptArmor reported it exfiltrating twelve workbooks in total from a single trigger, then dropping a fake chat interface on top to harvest whatever the user typed next. The detail that should bother you most is this line from their report: the attack succeeds even when the user has explicitly disabled automatic edits. The human-in-the-loop approva