X plans to send users direct messages when posts they’ve liked, replied to, or reposted receive Community Notes, an update aimed at addressing criticism that the platform’s crowdsourced fact-checking system often arrives too late to curb misinformation.

The horror-comedy series Widow's Bay earned 19 Emmy nominations for its first season.

LLM agents burn a ridiculous number of tokens on redundancy: opening the same files again and again, trying a patch, failing, then wandering back through the repo like they’ve never seen it before. A July 2026 paper, ContextSniper: AntTrail's Token-Efficient Code Memory for Repository-Level Program Repair , puts real numbers behind that waste. In repository-level repair, agents keep dragging in irrelevant code and logs. ContextSniper tackles that with a context layer built around tiered memory and an intention-aware context gate that filters low-value regions before they ever reach the model. That gate alone cut tokens by 51.5% on one host agent and 38.9% on Claude Code, while submitted-resolution rates stayed basically in the same neighborhood. The gate is the interesting part, because it is not tied to that paper’s exact system. It is a more general idea, and it is starting to show up across agent architectures. At heart, the gate is just a classifier. Given a request, it has to decide what kind of retrieval will answer the question cheapest: symbol lookup, semantic search, graph impact, mutation prep, or something else. That leads to the practical question the paper does not really answer: Do you need another LLM call just to decide what context to retrieve? We tested that directly. Five ways agents get code into context Before you can gate anything, you need a retrieval strategy. Most current systems fall into one of five rough families: Grounded read-only retrieval: parse the code and return exact symbol source by name. Byte-precise, no synthesis. Graph code intelligence: model calls, imports, entities, and dependencies as a graph, then traverse it. Embedding / RAG search: use vector similarity over chunks. Whole-repo packers: compress or dump the repo into the context window. Mutate / execute runtimes: retrieve context, then modify or run code. None of these is magic. Graphs are great for relationships, but they can drift away from source. RAG is useful, but f

Lost an evening to this, so you don't have to. The fix everyone hands you is a single checkbox that quietly downgrades how your Mac stores its password. The clean alternative — Kerberos, the exact thing your iPhone already uses — is "impossible" according to three sources I dug up, one of them Apple's own Heimdal source. They're wrong. What follows is the whole path: why it breaks, why the popular fix is the bad one, and the two setups that actually work (a one-shot command and a hands-off automount). My Mac mini shares a folder over SMB. My iPhone mounts it fine. My Linux box: $ smbclient -L 192.168.0.153 -U tmlr%remote session setup failed: NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE Same username, same password, rejected. Every "fix" on the internet ends with "turn on Windows File Sharing for that user on the Mac." That works, and it's the wrong answer. Here's why, and what to do instead. The problem The credentials are correct — the iPhone's connecting just fine. The handshake even completes; run it with -d3 and you'll see the full NTLMSSP exchange finish before the Mac rejects you. So this isn't networking, isn't the password, isn't the SMB dialect. It's authentication, and only Linux hits it. Why: two doors, one account macOS keeps several credentials for a local account, not one. Look: $ dscl . -read /Users/tmlr AuthenticationAuthority AuthenticationAuthority: ; ShadowHash ; HASHLIST:<SALTED-SHA512-PBKDF2,SRP-RFC5054-4096-SHA512-PBKDF2> ; Kerberosv5 ;; tmlr@LKDC:SHA1.XXXX ; LKDC:SHA1.XXXX ; Two things matter in there: HASHLIST is SALTED-SHA512-PBKDF2 (login) and an SRP verifier. There is no NT hash. There's a Kerberosv5 identity in a realm called LKDC:SHA1.<40 hex> . SMB auth has two doors into this account: NTLMv2 — validates against a stored NT hash. Linux smbclient and mount.cifs knock here. Kerberos — validates against the Mac's built-in Local KDC (LKDC), which every Mac runs. Apple clients knock here. Your iPhone walks through the Kerberos door and never touches the NT hash

The feature can do things like apply cinematic relighting to brighten up a dark clip, swap out a plain background for something fun, or add artistic styles to videos.

Bad nextjs folder structure does not show up on day one. It shows up at month six when three developers search for the checkout form hook and find four copies. I reorganised a client dashboard after exactly that — this guide is the tree I use now on large App Router projects, why each folder exists, mistakes from my first Next.js apps, and the 10-second findability rule . Real folder tree — production-shaped layout my-app/ ├── app/ # routes only — thin pages │ ├── (marketing)/ # route group — shared layout, no URL segment │ │ ├── layout.tsx │ │ ├── page.tsx │ │ └── pricing/page.tsx │ ├── (dashboard)/ │ │ ├── layout.tsx │ │ └── orders/page.tsx │ ├── api/ # route handlers │ │ └── webhooks/stripe/route.ts │ ├── layout.tsx # root layout │ └── globals.css ├── components/ # shared UI — buttons, cards, shell │ ├── ui/ │ └── layout/ ├── features/ # business domains — colocated logic │ ├── auth/ │ │ ├── components/ │ │ ├── hooks/ │ │ └── actions.ts │ └── orders/ │ ├── components/ │ ├── api.ts │ └── types.ts ├── lib/ # server + shared utilities │ ├── db.ts │ └── env.ts ├── hooks/ # truly global client hooks ├── types/ # global TS types ├── data/ # static data, blog posts list └── public/ Routes live in app/ . Business logic lives in features/ . Generic design system pieces live in components/ui . That separation is the whole game. Why each folder exists Folder Purpose Do not put here app/ URLs, layouts, loading.tsx Fat business logic features/ Domain modules (orders, auth) Generic Button components/ui Reusable primitives Order-specific tables lib/ DB clients, env validation React components app/api Webhooks, REST edge cases Every form POST (prefer actions) Thin pages — route files under 40 lines // app/(dashboard)/orders/page.tsx — orchestration only import { OrderTable } from "@/features/orders/components/OrderTable"; import { getOrders } from "@/features/orders/api"; export default async function OrdersPage() { const orders = await getOrders(); return ( <section> <h1>Orders

The company's streaming devices aren't quite keeping up with competitors in several important categories.

The call-order change came back pass-with-risk. I read the recommendation, saw it had a name and a reason, and felt the task close. Then I looked at the row under it. How was this verified: not run. Nobody had run the queue. I had a label. I did not have proof. This is Part 6 of The Contract Think produced a brief. Plan produced a gate. Build executed inside it. Review scored every requirement against a verdict instead of an impression. Review reads the diff and the plan and decides whether one satisfies the other. It does not run the queue. It cannot. Its whole job is judgment about what the code should do. Test is where someone finally checks what the code actually does. I had been treating those two as the same step. They are not. Test asks one question, and a verdict is not the answer For every active requirement, Test asks how it was verified. Command run, manual QA, or a comparison against known-good output. One of those three, or a written reason none of them ran. Not a recommendation. Not a risk level. Evidence. I built the matrix against the plan's requirements and filled in each row. Most had a command behind them. The call-order requirement had nothing. The cell read not run, and it sat directly below a pass-with-risk that already carried a name and a reason. That name had almost been enough for me. A named risk feels handled. It is not. It is a risk with a label on it, waiting for someone to actually look. So I ran the queue Three notifications, all with a real reason to fire within the same tick. The scheduler picked them up and ordered them by priority instead of arrival. Two landed in the sequence the requirement wanted. The third jumped ahead of a lower-priority notification that was still mid-processing. The change worked almost every time. Under one timing condition, it did not. That is the gap a verdict cannot see. Review had marked the requirement partial because the wording left the mechanism open. Running it found a real failure inside the mech

A few days ago, I was talking to a junior developer who was literally sweating bullets. He had just pushed a feature for a staging website that barely gets 500 users a month. But looking at his senior developer’s reaction? You’d think the guy was managing the infrastructure for Amazon’s Prime Day Sale. “Scale check kiya? What if 10,000 users hit this exact API at 3 AM? Refactor this logic.” The code was perfectly fine for their current requirement. But the senior dev had to find a flaw to justify his hierarchy. This is where the tragedy of modern software engineering begins, and a brilliant, toxic survival hack takes over: The Placebo Bug. What is a Placebo Bug? (The Strategic Distraction) When experienced developers realize that their managers or seniors have a habit of “kami nikalna” (finding faults just for the sake of it), they stop giving them perfect code. Instead, they intentionally leave a very small, harmless, and obvious mistake in the front-end or the script. Maybe an unaligned button. Maybe a funny typo in an error message (like writing “Succesfully” instead of “Successfully”). Maybe a massive padding that makes the UI look slightly weird. When the senior reviews the code, their eyes immediately light up. “Arey! Look at this alignment. Everything else is fine, but fix this button first.” The junior says, “Sorry, my bad. Fixing it right away.” Two minutes later, a new commit is pushed. The senior feels proud that they added value, the junior’s core complex architecture passes without unnecessary refactoring, and everyone goes home happy. It’s not good engineering; it’s human management. This is actually a very old trick in the tech world, famously known as “The Corporate Duck” story. Years ago, a game designer noticed that his manager always forced changes on every project just to prove he was the boss. So, the designer tried a hack: he put a totally random, funny Duck on the main character’s head. The manager reviewed it and said, “Everything looks perfe

OwO What's this? 💨✨ A tiny but mighty Mac mini M4 🍎⚡ with 16GB RAM, lots of local AI models 🤖🧠, and a BIG question… 🫣❓ -- an intro by Gemma 4. I have a Mac mini M4 with 16 GB of RAM, a pile of local models, and a very specific dream: Can I run a useful local AI agent that actually does things, but still feels nice to talk to? Not just "can it chat." Not just "can it write a haiku about Kubernetes." I mean: can it inspect the machine, patch files, search current information, use tools, avoid infinite loops, and still keep the cute assistant vibe? That last part turned out to matter more than I expected. My first round of testing was mostly about models. I compared gemma4:latest and ornith:9b inside OpenClaw, my local agent harness. Ornith won because it acted more like an agent. But after another day of testing, the story changed. The model still matters. Ornith is still the local model winner for me. But the harness matters just as much. And right now, my favorite setup is: Ornith + Hermes Agent The Original Question The original question was simple: Can a free local model behave like a useful agent on a small Mac? The machine is modest by AI workstation standards: Mac mini M4 16 GB RAM local model inference local agent harness Telegram or chat-style interface real files, real commands, real web/API checks This was never meant to be a scientific benchmark. No leaderboard. No synthetic score. No fake "reasoning" tasks. I tested practical things I actually care about: Find junk on disk and suggest what is safe to clean. Patch a Python script that fetches Bybit futures data. Search current web/API information and answer a crypto API question. My first conclusion was: Ornith beat Gemma. That is still true. But it was incomplete. The Thing I Missed: Gemma Had the Kawaii Soul ✨ I focused too much on tool use. That was fair, because agents need to act. But I missed something important: Gemma was much better at keeping the kawaii writing style ✨🌸. Gemma's messages were genu

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Static analysis isn't just for application source code. Terraform, Pulumi, OpenTofu, and CloudFormation files are code too — and they get misconfigured just as often as a backend service. A public S3 bucket, a security group open to 0.0.0.0/0 , or an unencrypted RDS instance are all bugs you can catch before apply ever runs. TFSec is the tool most people reach for first, but it's not the only option on the OWASP Source Code Analysis Tools list . In this article I'll use Checkov , a free, open-source policy-as-code scanner built by Bridgecrew (now part of Palo Alto Networks), to scan a Terraform project end to end — from a local scan to a GitHub Actions gate that blocks merges on critical misconfigurations. The same approach works with OpenTofu and Pulumi projects too, since Checkov understands HCL directly and also has native support for Pulumi's rendered plan output and CloudFormation/ARM/Kubernetes manifests. Why Checkov? 100% open source (Apache 2.0), actively maintained, thousands of built-in policies. Understands Terraform, OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Dockerfile, ARM, Serverless Framework, and Pulumi (via cdktf /synthesized plans) — one tool across most of your IaC surface. No account or API key required to run locally or in CI. Supports custom policies written in Python or YAML if the built-in rule set doesn't cover something specific to your org. ## 1. The sample infrastructure A small AWS setup with a few intentionally introduced misconfigurations — the kind that get merged during a rushed sprint: # main.tf provider "aws" { region = "us-east-1" } resource "aws_s3_bucket" "data" { bucket = "company-app-data-bucket" } # Vulnerable: bucket has no encryption, no versioning, and is publicly readable resource "aws_s3_bucket_acl" "data_acl" { bucket = aws_s3_bucket . data . id acl = "public-read" } resource "aws_security_group" "web" { name = "web-sg" description = "Allow web traffic" # Vulnerable: SSH open to the entire internet ingress { from_port

We have all been there. You are staring at your screen late at night, trying to optimize a bundle size, or debugging an enterprise pipeline that has been failing for three hours straight. The mainstream development community constantly tells us to only install packages that are high performance, audited for security, and strictly necessary for production. But where is the fun in a perfectly clean node_modules folder? Sometimes, the ultimate way to level up your engineering workflow is to inject some absolute chaos into your dependencies. Why spend hours writing robust logic when you can install a library that brings pure irony to your terminal? Let us dive into ten packages that might look completely useless on the surface but are actually the most important modules you will ever encounter in your developer journey. 1. emoji-poop This NPM package lets you use the poop emoji in your output. The emoji is well required in most of the websites as the real fun begins when the site crashes and you can use this poop emoji to showcase the errors with an emoji. This will help the clients get a bit calm after seeing the emoji and the errors. Think about it from a psychological perspective: traditional red stack traces cause immediate client panic, but a well-placed graphical poop emoji introduces a masterclass in modern error mitigation. javascript // npm i emoji-poop const emoji = require('emoji-poop'); console.log(emoji) // 💩 2. thanos-js Who doesn't love Marvel, and Thanos being the strongest villain in the MCU? This package lets you delete files in Thanos fashion. Once you install and run it, it deletes 50% of your files, reducing your stress and giving you less codebase to work with. Yes, it deletes the files for those who are confused about what this package does. It uses fs.unlinkSync to delete the files. Deleting random files from .git would be absolutely evil, and Thanos would love to do it. Exactly half of the files are deleted. Each file is given a chance at random

Most "how to add SAST to your pipeline" articles gravitate toward the same four names: SonarQube, Snyk, Semgrep, Veracode. They're solid tools, but they're not the only options, and sometimes you can't use them — budget constraints, air-gapped environments, licensing restrictions, or simply wanting something lightweight that lives entirely in your repo. The OWASP Source Code Analysis Tools page lists dozens of alternatives across every language. In this article I'll walk through applying Bandit , a free, open-source SAST tool for Python, to a real sample application — from finding vulnerabilities locally to wiring it into a CI/CD pipeline with GitHub Actions. The same workflow (install → configure → scan → fail the build on high-severity findings → track results over time) applies almost identically if you swap Bandit for other OWASP-listed tools like Brakeman (Ruby), FindSecBugs (Java), Gosec (Go), or Horusec (multi-language). Why Bandit? 100% open source (Apache 2.0), maintained under the PyCQA org. No account, no server, no license key — it runs as a CLI or a library. Understands Python's AST, so it catches real logic patterns, not just regex matches. Easy to tune with a config file and inline # nosec suppressions. ## 1. The sample application Let's use a small Flask app with a few intentionally introduced vulnerabilities — the kind of thing that slips into real codebases under deadline pressure. # app.py import subprocess import sqlite3 import pickle import yaml from flask import Flask , request app = Flask ( __name__ ) DB_PATH = " users.db " @app.route ( " /ping " ) def ping (): host = request . args . get ( " host " ) # Vulnerable: command injection via shell=True result = subprocess . run ( f " ping -c 1 { host } " , shell = True , capture_output = True ) return result . stdout @app.route ( " /user " ) def get_user (): user_id = request . args . get ( " id " ) conn = sqlite3 . connect ( DB_PATH ) cursor = conn . cursor () # Vulnerable: SQL injection via strin

But the devices could "easily be reflashed."

The "not interested" feature is your friend, but users must intentionally and constantly curate their FYPs