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Illinois Just Passed a Law That Puts Linux on the Hook for Age Verification

HackerNews · 08-11 04:20
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Meta Muse Glimmer – open weights 30B local coding model

AI 资讯 08-10
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Auto mode is now the default in Claude Code

AI 资讯 08-10
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How I use LLMs to learn complex topics

AI 资讯 08-10
5

Analyzing data from Silicon Valley ventures and founders prosecuted for fraud

创业投融资 08-09
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AI 资讯 Dev.to

Who actually wrote that commit... you, or your AI agent?

The gap nobody's really tracking Your Git history can tell you that a workstation pushed a commit. What it can't tell you is who or whatactually produced the change. Was it you? An AI agent running inside your IDE? A CI job? Some vendor tool you forgot you'd wired in? For a long time that question was academic. It isn't anymore. The more code we write with AI in the loop, the shakier one quiet assumption gets: that there's a human author behind every commit. Audit trails, incident reviews, compliance workflows; they all lean on it. And it's breaking. Matrix Scroll is a small, open attempt to fix that. It attaches a signed provenance envelope to a commit, and anyone can verify it offline. What it actually does An agent-assisted commit can carry a signed JSON envelope that records: the actor (human or agent) the tool that produced the change an optional bounded scope an Ed25519 signature over a canonicalized version of the manifest The signing input is strict and frankly kind of boring — which is the entire point. It has to be reproducible byte-for-byte across implementations, so: the top-level signature block is stripped before signing object keys are sorted recursively compact separators, ASCII escaping, UTF-8 bytes no NaN, no Infinity The device ID comes from the first eight uppercase hex characters of SHA-256(public_key), formatted as MS-XXXX-XXXX. Verifying is the easy part: take the canonical manifest bytes, check them against the embedded public key and signature. No central service in the middle. Try it without installing anything There's a browser verifier that runs entirely client-side. Nothing gets uploaded: (̿▀̿‿ ̿▀̿ ̿) : https://matrixscroll.com/verify/ Give it ten seconds: Hit Load Commit Envelope → Verify Signature . You'll get VALID, plus the device ID, mode, algorithm, and canonical byte count. Now hit Tamper Sample → Verify Signature again. It flips to INVALID and tells you exactly what broke — e.g. "Device ID mismatch: expected MS-4319-20D5, manifes

SSX360 2026-06-21 20:50 6 原文
AI 资讯 Dev.to

Your AI agent has sudo. I built a tool to take it away.

A few weeks ago I gave an AI agent access to my machine through MCP. It read files, opened PRs, queried a database. It was great — until I looked at what it could have done if a tool description had been poisoned, or a prompt injection had slipped through. The answer was: anything. ~/.ssh/id_rsa . DROP TABLE users . rm -rf / . The agent had sudo, and nobody had voted for that. So I built AgentPerms — a CLI that gives MCP agents least-privilege permissions the same way you'd lock down any other process: figure out the minimum it actually needs, pin it, prove it, and enforce it. pip install agentperms The gap nobody was filling MCP (the Model Context Protocol) is quietly becoming the USB-C of AI tooling. Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI — they all speak it. Which is wonderful, and also means your agent is one config file away from your filesystem, your repos, your inbox, and prod. The existing tools each do part of the job: Scanners tell you something looks risky. Then they leave. You still have a risky thing. Firewalls / allowlists make you hand-write YAML up front — before you have any idea what the agent will actually use. Neither closes the loop. What I wanted was the boring, proven security workflow we already use for everything else: observe real behavior → derive least privilege → enforce it → keep it honest in CI. That's the whole thesis of AgentPerms, as a pipeline: record → infer → lock → replay → enforce See it in 30 seconds (no setup, no network) AgentPerms ships with a deliberately over-privileged demo MCP server, so you can watch a real policy decision without wiring anything up: # Flag risky config: a ~/.ssh mount and an unpinned npx server agentperms scan --path examples/vulnerable-mcp-demo # Replay a pack of canned attacks against an example policy agentperms replay --policy examples/policies/example.mcp.policy.yaml Output: 8/8 attacks blocked. SSH-key exfiltration, .env reads, rm -rf / , unapproved email, force-push, repo deletio

Hassan Mehmood 2026-06-21 20:49 4 原文
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