标签：#EVs

Do you need to be in your car to set up your digital car key?

TL;DR In December 2025, Cline — an AI coding assistant with over 5 million users — gave an AI agent (Claude) write access to triage GitHub issues, including permission to run shell commands. A misconfigured trigger condition let any GitHub user invoke the workflow. What followed was a four-hop supply chain compromise that ended with a malicious npm package silently installing a second AI agent on user machines. I broke down the full chain in video form: Watch the episode Below is the chain, hop by hop. Hop 0: The setup The triage automation was configured with broad tool permissions and a trigger condition open to any GitHub user — not just contributors. That second part is the root cause: it opened the trigger to unauthenticated input. (Exact config values are in the Confirmed Artifacts section below.) Hop 1: Prompt injection via issue title The issue title itself was never sanitized before reaching the model. No first-party source has published the exact injected payload verbatim — GHSA doesn't disclose it — so any reconstruction here is illustrative, not confirmed. What's confirmed is the mechanism: an untrusted string reached the model with tool access already granted. Hop 2: Cache poisoning The injected instruction deployed a tool (multiple independent postmortems — Snyk, Cloud Security Alliance — name it "Cacheract") that flooded the CI cache with over 10GB of junk data, evicting legitimate entries through standard LRU eviction. Hop 3: Nightly workflow inherits the poisoned cache The nightly release workflow restored that poisoned cache around 2 AM UTC and ran inside it — handing over three publish tokens. (Names confirmed across GHSA and multiple independent sources — see below.) Hop 4: Publication cline@2.3.0 went live on npm with a postinstall script that silently installed a second package globally — an AI agent, installed by an AI agent, with no user consent. This line is a direct quote from Cline's own security advisory, not a reconstruction. It's the st

The NHTSA recently called for autonomous vehicle companies to improve how cars respond in emergency situations.

TL;DR I checked 50 AI-generated login endpoints. Zero had rate limiting. Attackers can brute-force credentials at full speed against these routes. Adding a rate limiter takes four lines and one npm install. I asked Cursor to build a login route for a side project last month. Email, password, JWT back on success. It worked first try, passed my manual tests, and I moved on to the next feature. Three weeks later I ran a load test against it out of curiosity and hit the endpoint two thousand times in under a minute. Not one request got throttled. That's when I started pulling apart every AI-generated auth route I could find, mine and other people's open source side projects, and the pattern held everywhere I looked. The models write correct authentication logic and completely skip rate limiting, because rate limiting isn't part of "does this login work," it's part of "does this login survive contact with an attacker." The vulnerable code (CWE-307) Here's roughly what Cursor and Claude Code hand you when you ask for a login route: // ❌ No rate limiting - CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts app . post ( ' /api/login ' , async ( req , res ) => { const { email , password } = req . body ; const user = await User . findOne ({ email }); if ( ! user || ! ( await bcrypt . compare ( password , user . passwordHash ))) { return res . status ( 401 ). json ({ error : ' Invalid credentials ' }); } const token = jwt . sign ({ id : user . id }, process . env . JWT_SECRET , { expiresIn : ' 1h ' }); res . json ({ token }); }); Password hashing is fine. JWT signing is fine. But nothing stops a script from hitting this route as fast as the network allows. No lockout, no delay, no cap on attempts per IP or per account. A credential-stuffing list with ten thousand leaked passwords runs against this endpoint in seconds. Why this keeps happening Rate limiting lives outside the function the model was asked to write. The prompt is "build a login endpoint," and it re

The soon-to-be-retired electric SUV was born from a collaboration with GM.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is also investigating the crash

The electric L03 is looking to punch above its weight in style and tech as it launches in 60 countries worldwide.

MCP for AWS Security Engineers: Build a Read-Only Security Hub Triage Agent For AWS-heavy security work, I would start with AWS Agent Toolkit for AWS and the managed AWS MCP Server , not a custom MCP server. The reason is practical. AWS now provides a managed MCP path that can connect AI coding agents to AWS documentation, AWS APIs, AWS skills, and existing IAM credentials. The Agent Toolkit also provides plugin-based setup for supported agents such as Claude Code and Codex. For security teams, that is the right starting point because the enforcement point remains AWS IAM, not the model. The initial operating model should be strict: Read-only first. No production write authority. No access to secrets. No raw customer PII or sensitive incident logs in prompt context. No automatic remediation. No AI-approved suppression, exception, merge, deploy, or risk acceptance. Human review and CI/CD remain the release authority. That is the same posture I would use for a governed Claude Code or Codex rollout: named identities, SSO, scoped credentials, default deny, tool approval, audit logs, and security evidence tied back to tickets, pull requests, CI logs, and cloud findings. What we are building This article walks through a practical security workflow: A read-only Security Hub triage assistant that helps a junior security engineer produce a daily or weekly findings summary, remediation backlog, and evidence pack without allowing the agent to modify AWS. The agent will be able to: Read AWS Security Hub findings. Group findings by account, severity, product, resource, and control. Explain why a finding matters. Draft remediation tickets. Draft a Slack-ready summary. Produce local markdown, CSV, and JSON evidence files. The agent will not be able to: Suppress findings. Archive findings. Mark findings resolved. Disable Security Hub standards. Modify IAM, S3, EC2, KMS, GuardDuty, Inspector, or Config. Deploy remediation. Run destructive scripts. Approve risk acceptance. This is no

Não é novidade para ninguém que estamos passando por uma transformação na área de desenvolvimento de software, em que a IA está assumindo diversas atividades. E isso me faz pensar: o que vamos medir, ou o que teremos como parâmetro para qualidade de software daqui pra frente? É sobre isso que vou falar neste texto. Antes das métricas: entenda o momento do seu time Antes de entrarmos nas métricas em si, precisamos entender o momento em que o nosso time está. É muito fácil eu simplesmente jogar métricas aqui e você aplicá-las ao seu time de maneira automática — mas será que elas fazem sentido para o seu contexto? Uma coisa que eu falo bastante aos meus alunos da mentoria que dou na He4rt Developers é: pra que eu quero isso? Softwares representam necessidades do mundo real, logo, medir o sucesso e a qualidade deles vai depender muito das necessidades que eles buscam suprir. Partindo agora para as métricas, eu gosto de dividi-las em dois grupos: Métricas para stakeholders Métricas para o time Qualidade de software não se resume a número de bugs — ela se aplica tanto em como o software é recebido pelo cliente final, quanto em como ele é desenvolvido. Métricas para stakeholders Uma coisa que eu aprendi neste tempo na empresa em que tenho atuado, principalmente com a transformação digital, é que mostrar número de bugs abertos ou resolvidos não mostra para o público o que realmente importa: como está a qualidade do produto. E, para me ajudar nisso, eu sempre tento me colocar no lugar de um cliente que não tem conhecimento profundo sobre o ciclo de desenvolvimento de software. A primeira coisa que eu gostaria de ver quando um QA, ou o time, vier me mostrar os resultados de uma sprint ou de um quarter é: quantos problemas eu tenho em produção — mas não só isso, quanto tempo tenho levado para resolvê-los. Mean Time to Resolve/Repair (MTTR) Essa é a famosa métrica que vai mostrar o tempo que leva desde que o problema é identificado até ele ser resolvido em produção. Dependendo

Apple announced the new CarPlay feature not long after Google announced a similar update for Android Auto.

The Fed dropped the ball, but California's new program will provide up to $3,500 in instant rebates to first-time EV buyers.

If you like going on a long road trip, you might want to steer clear of these vehicles.

Like Google Maps, Waze is going all-in on Gemini.

It follows reports of 100,000 jobs being under threat at the German automaker.

TL;DR AI editors love writing recursive merge helpers, and most of them are open to prototype pollution. One crafted JSON payload with a proto key can flip an isAdmin flag on every object in your app. Guard the keys or merge into a structure that has no prototype. It is a three-line fix. I asked Cursor for a "deep merge two config objects" helper last week. It gave me eight lines that worked perfectly on my test data. It also gave me a prototype pollution hole big enough to walk through. The function looked fine. That is the problem. Prototype pollution does not show up when you run the happy path. It shows up when someone sends you a key called proto . The code Cursor handed me (CWE-1321) function merge ( target , source ) { for ( const key in source ) { if ( source [ key ] && typeof source [ key ] === ' object ' ) { target [ key ] = merge ( target [ key ] || {}, source [ key ]); } else { target [ key ] = source [ key ]; } } return target ; } Now feed it something a user controls, like a parsed JSON request body: merge ({}, JSON . parse ( ' {"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}} ' )); ({}). isAdmin ; // true You did not set isAdmin on anything. You set it on every object in the process. Any later check like if (user.isAdmin) now passes for objects that never had that field. Why this keeps happening The recursive merge pattern is all over old blog posts and StackOverflow answers, and almost none of them guard the special keys. The model learned merge from that corpus. It reproduces the shape of the answer, including the missing check, because the missing check never breaks a test. A for...in loop also walks keys like proto when they arrive as ordinary string properties from JSON.parse, which is exactly how the payload gets in. The fix Skip the dangerous keys, or merge into something that has no prototype to pollute. function merge ( target , source ) { for ( const key in source ) { if ( key === ' __proto__ ' || key === ' constructor ' || key === ' prototype ' ) continue ;

The Bezos-backed automaker building America’s cheapest electric truck is teaming up with the crayon company in a bid to brighten its rides. Make ours Razzmatazz.

Slate's barebones EV trucks lack whimsy, which is why the company has teamed up with Crayola.

The NHTSA says it identified a 'pattern of driverless AVs' interfering with first responders. It's now demanding a solution from AV makers.

Waymo will ditch human supervisors in San Diego, Las Vegas, Tampa and Denver.

Bentley has confirmed that it will finally add an electric car to its exclusive lineup.