Throughout my career I have had to work with quite a few platform teams, and I was part of two for a couple of years. Some were bad, some were good and some should not have existed at all. I want to tell you my user experience, what I have seen work and what not and what you should definitely avoid doing. Be The Multiplier This is the main goal of a platform team. As a team, it needs to be a multiplier. If the platform team supports 10 teams, then each work it commits should multiply by 10. If the team member builds a new feature, it should be helpful for all the other teams. Otherwise, the platform team is an addition, and in most cases it is then better to split the platform team and add them to all other teams, instead of being a separate team. Because the amount of communication needed is in most cases quadratic in relation to the number of teams. Reducing Cognitive Load The platform should take away cognitive load for all the teams it supports. By doing so, they will have more time to implement business requirements. Let's say a platform team provides Gitlab runners or Azure Agents where people can run their CI/CD code on. They should not need to know how the runners are scaled, or how the agents are updated. This takes away the need for that skill set in all the teams. Build a Community A platform team has a unique position. It is building something that all other developers probably can build as well. Some could do it even better than the platform team itself. For some platform teams, their ego sometimes comes in to play or just straight up refuses their help because they are not the team. But it is not the job of the platform team to build a product, but a platform where everyone can thrive and/or build on. So onboard the community on the platform! The Law of Diffusion applies to almost all companies. You will have the innovators that want to build it themselves and the early adopters that will voice their opinion, but will not build it themselves. Those two

Microsoft also has to pay roughly $400 in damages to the user.

A new side-by-side measurement shows Claude Code ships roughly 33,000 tokens of system prompt, tool schemas, and scaffolding before your prompt even arrives — about 4.7x the ~7,000 tokens OpenCode sends on the same setup. The bigger cost surprise is next: Claude Code re-wrote up to 54x more prompt-cache tokens per session, and cache writes bill at a premium. How the test was run The benchmark (published by Systima) spliced a logging proxy between each harness and the model endpoint, capturing the exact request payload and the API's usage block. Both harnesses were pinned to the same conditions: Claude Code 2.1.207 and OpenCode 1.17.18 , both pointed at claude-sonnet-4-5 Fresh config directories, empty workspace, no MCP servers, no instruction files, permissions bypassed Tasks ranged from "reply with OK" (isolating fixed overhead) to a write-run-test-fix loop against FizzBuzz A zero-tools variant separated system-prompt weight from tool-schema weight The payload captures are exact; the only adjustment was subtracting a constant ~6,200-token gateway envelope that wrapped every request in the test setup. The fixed floor Harness Fixed overhead before your prompt Cache-write behavior Claude Code 2.1.207 ~33,000 tokens Re-wrote tens of thousands of cache tokens per run; up to 54x OpenCode OpenCode 1.17.18 ~7,000 tokens Byte-identical prefix each run; cached once, read back cheaply OpenCode's request prefix was byte-identical in every captured run, so it paid to cache its payload once per session and read it back for pennies. Claude Code re-wrote large amounts of prompt-cache tokens mid-session, run after run — and because cache writes bill at a premium, one usage dashboard climbs while the other stays flat. Where it piles on in real setups The harness floor is only the start. The benchmark added variables one at a time: A production repository's 72KB instruction file added an average of ~20,000 tokens to every request. Five modest MCP servers added 5,000–7,000 more. By th

Vintage games can be hard to find, but Nintendo GameCube titles are exceptionally elusive.

Hello HN, I don't post on here much, but wanted to get some eyes on a new project I'm just launching. I think we definitely need one more AI code agent.. I'm a long-term C++ dev, and over 30+ years I've created some successful audio dev tools (JUCE, the Tracktion DAW, the Cmajor DSP language). All of these came from me getting annoyed with something I had to use, and deciding to have a go at my own take on whatever it was. So Juggler is my attempt at an AI code agent, after spending too many hou

This started based off of a hunch. We usually use OpenCode, but were 'forced' to use Claude Code for a while due to issues with Meridian. In that time, we saw the usage meter rise much, much more quickly than when using OpenCode. This was the initial anecdotal evidence, but we undertook this small study to collect empirical data: We added logging between the agentic coding tool (Claude Code and OpenCode) and Anthropic's endpoint, and captured all requests (and the returned usage blocks). With on

No hacking — a passive scan only looks at what your browser already downloads when it opens a page. Here's what I found: 6 of 15 load their Supabase database directly client-side. The public API key sits in the page source. That's fine if Row-Level Security is configured right — but it's one wrong setting away from "anyone can read the whole table." 14 of 15 ship no Content-Security-Policy — a simple, high-value hardening against script injection, almost always missing. Is this theoretical? No. Two apps I audited with the owner's permission: A social app: the profiles table — user names, cities, and a password hash — readable by a logged-out stranger. Closed in an afternoon. A paid learning app: 155 paid study sheets and 4,872 answers were readable by anyone, with no account and no subscription — its entire paid catalogue, a single API call away. The paywall lived only in the front-end; the database served everything to everyone. Loading Supabase in the browser isn't the mistake. Not enforcing access in the database (RLS) is. And the tools you build with won't tell you — they'll happily ship it. If you built something on Lovable / Bolt / Replit with real users (or paying ones), it's worth 60 seconds to check what a stranger can already see. I made a free tool that runs the surface check (passive, no signup): sealdy.dev Happy to answer questions on how RLS leaks happen and how to lock them down.

The Developer's Guide to Picking the Right Coding LLM at Scale Six months ago, I was staring at our monthly AI bill — $14,000 and climbing fast. We were using the "premium" model for everything, including trivial code completions. That night, I built a small internal benchmark to figure out which models actually earn their cost. What I learned reshaped how we think about AI tooling, vendor lock-in, and what "production-ready" really means. Here's the raw truth from my testing rig, what we shipped, and how we cut costs by 70% without touching output quality. Why I Stopped Trusting Default Recommendations Every vendor says their model is the best. Every benchmark site ranks things differently. Most "best of" lists are either sponsored or built on vibes. I needed numbers that matched my actual workflow: generating Python services, debugging JavaScript race conditions, implementing TypeScript algorithms, and reviewing Go for security. So I took ten models, threw identical prompts at them, and scored them myself. No vendor PR. No cherry-picked examples. Just the same five tasks, run the same way, scored on the same rubric. Here are the ten models I tested, with their output pricing per million tokens — because at scale, that's the metric that decides whether your AI strategy is viable or a margin killer. Model Provider Output $/M DeepSeek V4 Flash DeepSeek $0.25 DeepSeek Coder DeepSeek $0.25 Qwen3-Coder-30B Qwen $0.35 DeepSeek V4 Pro DeepSeek $0.78 DeepSeek-R1 DeepSeek $2.50 Kimi K2.5 Moonshot $3.00 GLM-5 Zhipu $1.92 Qwen3-32B Qwen $0.28 Hunyuan-Turbo Tencent $0.57 Ga-Standard GA Routing $0.20 Before you ask: yes, I tested against the originals. I also tested against Global API's unified routing layer, which lets you hit any of these through one endpoint. More on that later — it became the architectural decision that actually saved us. My Benchmark Methodology (No Marketing Fluff) I built five tasks that mirror what my engineers actually do every week. Not synthetic acad

If you’ve ever struggled with CALCULATE() or wondered why SUMX() behaves differently from SUM() , this guide is for you. DAX (Data Analysis Expressions) is the language that powers Power BI , Analysis Services , and Power Pivot — enabling dynamic calculations, filtering, and time intelligence. Below is a categorized cheat sheet of essential DAX functions , plus examples showing how to use each in real-world Power BI scenarios. Filtering & Context These functions control how filters are applied and evaluated in your calculations. Function Example Description CALCULATE() CALCULATE(SUM(Sales[Amount]), Region[Name] = "Nairobi") Changes filter context to calculate total sales for Nairobi. FILTER() FILTER(Sales, Sales[Amount] > 10000) Returns a table filtered by condition. ALL() CALCULATE(SUM(Sales[Amount]), ALL(Region)) Ignores filters on Region. REMOVEFILTERS() CALCULATE(SUM(Sales[Amount]), REMOVEFILTERS(Region)) Removes filters from Region. VALUES() VALUES(Customer[City]) Returns unique list of cities. SELECTEDVALUE() SELECTEDVALUE(Product[Category], "All") Returns selected category or “All” if none. TREATAS() TREATAS(VALUES(Temp[City]), Customer[City]) Applies one table’s values as filters on another. KEEPFILTERS() CALCULATE(SUM(Sales[Amount]), KEEPFILTERS(Product[Category] = "Electronics")) Keeps existing filters and adds new ones. ALLSELECTED() CALCULATE(SUM(Sales[Amount]), ALLSELECTED(Region)) Respects user selections in visuals. ALLEXCEPT() CALCULATE(SUM(Sales[Amount]), ALLEXCEPT(Sales, Sales[Year])) Removes all filters except Year. Aggregation Summarize or aggregate data across rows or columns. Function Example Description SUM() SUM(Sales[Amount]) Adds all sales amounts. AVERAGE() AVERAGE(Sales[Amount]) Calculates mean value. COUNT() COUNT(Customer[ID]) Counts non-blank entries. COUNTROWS() COUNTROWS(Sales) Counts rows in a table. DISTINCTCOUNT() DISTINCTCOUNT(Customer[ID]) Counts unique customers. MIN() MIN(Sales[Amount]) Finds smallest sale. MAX() MAX(Sales[Amo

We Taught a Snowflake Warehouse to Judge World Cup Conviction and Write the Verdict Back to Solana Soumyadeep Dey Soumyadeep Dey Soumyadeep Dey Follow Jul 12 We Taught a Snowflake Warehouse to Judge World Cup Conviction and Write the Verdict Back to Solana # devchallenge # weekendchallenge # snowflake 5 reactions 1 comment 16 min read

You know the story. You write a consumer, test it locally, deploy to staging, everything green. Then in production, the same message gets processed twice. Orders are duplicated. Notifications go out twice. Everyone blames "a race condition" and moves on. We spent the last few months formally verifying what actually happens when consumers crash with at-least-once delivery semantics. The short version: it doesn't matter which broker you use . The race condition is a property of the delivery contract, not a bug in the implementation. What we did Instead of writing more integration tests hoping to reproduce the timing, we wrote a formal specification of the consumer-broker interaction in TLA+ (the specification language by Leslie Lamport). The model checker exhaustively explores every possible interleaving of events — not just the ones you think to test. Then we took the counterexamples from the model and validated them in real running systems using Docker + Toxiproxy (network fault injection). If the math said "double-execution is possible", we confirmed it with actual containers. What we found We applied this pipeline to five different systems: Celery — ACK timeout + network blip: the model found the crash window at depth 9 (444 states). Chaos confirmed it: task executed twice. RabbitMQ — consumer stores result, drops connection before AMQP ACK. Same pattern. 108 states, depth 7. Chaos confirmed. NATS JetStream — consumer crashes after DB write, before ACK. 47 states, depth 6. Docker kill + Toxiproxy confirmed: duplicate execution. Apache Pulsar — batch consumer crashes between Process and SendAck. 21 states, depth 4. Chaos confirmed: 2 DB rows for 1 message. Kafka — consumer commits offset after processing. Crash between StoreResult and commitSync(). Same result: double execution. Every single time, the model predicted the collision and chaos confirmed it. The insight The spec is the same across all five systems. The variable names change, but the topology is identic

This is Part 1 of a 5-part series on Cisco EEM. We start here with the fundamentals and a few working applets, then build toward self-healing networks, automated diagnostics, compliance guardrails, and a complete real-world deployment. Ask ten network engineers what they use EEM for, and nine will say the same thing: "Oh, I have an applet that auto-recovers err-disabled ports." Then they never touch it again. That's a shame, because Embedded Event Manager is one of the most capable tools already sitting inside every Cisco IOS device you own — and almost nobody uses more than 1% of it. It's a full automation engine that lives on the box . No external server. No API gateway. No orchestration platform. Just the router or switch, watching itself, ready to react the instant something happens — even if the WAN is cut, the NMS is down, and it's three in the morning. This series is about using that other 99%. By the end you'll have a toolkit of applets you can deploy and, more importantly, a way of thinking about on-box automation. But we start at the foundation: what EEM actually is, how it's put together, and why "on the box" is a bigger deal than it sounds. What EEM actually is Embedded Event Manager is an event-driven automation framework built into Cisco IOS, IOS-XE, and NX-OS. Strip away the jargon and it's a very simple idea: When something happens, do something about it — automatically, on the device itself. That "something happens" is an event . That "do something" is one or more actions . Bundle an event with its actions and you have an applet — the basic unit of EEM. That's the whole model. The power comes from how many different things can be an event , and how much an action can do. Events EEM can watch for include: A syslog message matching a pattern (an interface flapping, an HSRP state change, a config being saved). An SNMP OID crossing a threshold (CPU over 85%, a power supply going absent, temperature rising). A CLI command being entered (someone typing wr

Every operating system has security gaps. Most never publish them. I am publishing mine. IONA OS is a sovereign operating system written from scratch in Rust. It has a kernel, a GUI, a blockchain protocol, a programming language, and a 140,000‑line AI running in Ring 0. It is designed to be secure by default. But secure is a journey, not a destination. Here is the hard list — the security issues I found in IONA OS, and what I am doing about them. 1. The filesystem is not encrypted at rest IONAFS reads and writes sectors in plain text directly to the disk. I already have a real ChaCha20‑Poly1305 engine with per‑file key derivation ( fs/encrypted_storage.rs ), but it is only used for backup/distribution — not for everyday local reading and writing ( fs/ionafs/mod.rs ). Why this matters: For a journalist or a civil servant, this is the central threat scenario: a lost device, confiscation at a border, or seizure. What I'm doing about it: Integrating encrypted_storage.rs into the normal IONAFS read/write path. Every write will be encrypted automatically. The key will be derived from a PIN or TPM. 2. Deleting a file does not destroy it delete_file() removes only the index entry. The data sectors remain on the disk, recoverable with standard forensic tools. Why this matters: For users with high security requirements — journalists, activists, government officials — this is a critical gap. What I'm doing about it: Adding a shred() function that overwrites the data sectors with random patterns before releasing them, with a configurable number of passes. 3. The keystore uses XOR, not real encryption security/keystore.rs pretends to use AES/ChaCha in its comments, but the actual implementation is a simple XOR stream — trivial to break once an attacker has access to the disk. Why this matters: This is a critical vulnerability. XOR is not encryption. If an attacker has access to the disk, they can recover the keys. What I'm doing about it: Replacing the XOR stream with real ChaCh

I wanted to build something different from the usual fan project. Instead of recreating gameplay, I asked a different question: How well do players actually remember the worlds of Super Mario Odyssey? The result is OdysseyGuessr, a browser game inspired by GeoGuessr. Players receive a screenshot from one of the game's Kingdoms and must place a marker on the correct location. Every meter counts. The project includes: Browser-based gameplay Single-player with customizable rounds Real-time multiplayer with a 5,000 HP battle system Community-submitted locations Admin moderation tools One of the biggest challenges wasn't the gameplay—it was collecting interesting locations that were difficult but still fair. Watching players confidently choose the wrong cliff or rooftop has been surprisingly entertaining. If you're interested in browser games or Nintendo fan projects, I'd love to hear your feedback. Play here: https://odyssey-guessr.lovable.app OdysseyGuessr is an unofficial fan project and is not affiliated with Nintendo.

What’s up everyone! Back again for my daily drop. We talk a lot about deployment frequency and lead time for changes, but if you're a solo dev or part of a small team building something like LaunchAlly , there’s one metric that rules them all: Time to Recovery (TTR) from a bad push. When you're marketing, coding, and handling support all at once, a broken main branch is a massive bottleneck. Here is my quick tip for today: Invest 20 minutes into setting up strict automated rollbacks . If a deployment fails health checks, let the system revert it instantly without your intervention. Spend lots of hours working today...happy to go to bed now:) What’s your go-to strategy for handling failed deployments on the fly?